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Abstract 
Illicit drugs and drug abuse are one of the most prevailing socio-economic issues in modern 
societies. The social cost that dependent users cause themselves and others in society can be 
massive. This problem is particularly hard to deal with and no comprehensive solution exists. 
Responding to the drug problem through public policy interventions has still been a priority in 
many societies. According to economic theory such interventions can only be justified based 
on the individual drug user not taking into account all the cost connected to his decision, 
which causes unintended or unrealized effects. From a behavioural economic perspective 
public policy intervention can help prevent decision failure that is causing an undesired self-
harm to the user. From a more traditional economic perspective the only policy justification is 
based on externalities or the harm inflicted upon others by the consumption decision of the 
drug user. Both arguments are considered relevant in the case of Iceland. To support the 
discussion on policy justification and the implication for supply-side policy the average social 
cost of illicit drug use per year is estimated. Even though drug abuse is not relatively 
widespread in Iceland the average social cost the society is faced with each year seems 
considerable. General negativity towards illicit drugs has probably hindered further expansion 
of the drug market. Furthermore, the tough supply-side enforcement in Iceland has possibly 
prevented heroin (which is very costly to society) from gaining foothold in the economy.  
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1 Introduction 
Drug abuse is a global phenomenon and many of its causes and results are universal. 
According to the global estimates of UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) 
approximately 5,2% of adults have used drugs in the last year, and around 11% of those 
individuals have dependency problems (UNODC, 2014). In spite of some common factors, 
the core of the drug problem varies between different nations. Drug abuse can harm domestic 
public health and safety through a variety of channels. For some societies the most harm is 
generated by the actual drug consumption while for others it is the drug trafficking or some 
other aspects of the problem (Babor, Caulkins et al., 2010; Babor, Room and Strang, 2010).  
Many believe illicit drug abuse to be the most serious social problem in modern societies, and 
drug abuse is most likely connected to other complex social problems. (Babor, Caulkins et al., 
2010; Babor, Room et al., 2010). Based on this connection, and the complexity of the 
problem, drug treatment is often insufficient to deal with the addiction. The social background 
of addicts can induce abuse of hard drugs and criminal activity as a coping mechanism for 
their misery and lack of hope (Gunnlaugsson, 2002). Furthermore, the drug abuse can also be 
the cause of social problems or create more for those already suffering. Drugs and illicit drug 
use is therefore a prevailing socio-economic issue. A comprehensive solution to the problem 
does not exist and this issue is particularly hard to deal with. Therefore, many drug policies 
are inefficient which causes more waste of resources than necessary and perhaps extra harm 
to the drug users. Furthermore, drug policy is a complex and political field and therefore, if it 
actually existed, the implementation of an “efficient” drug policy might not even work 
(Babor, Room et al., 2010; Moore, 2007).  
Responding to the drug problem has been a high priority in the public policy of many 
countries. In spite of great efforts in drug enforcement illicit drugs seem to be firmly 
established in most societies. Research have shown that most who try or use drugs do not 
become dependent or develop drug-related problems. Many drug consumer use these 
substances similarly as non-addicted people use alcohol. However, there are always some 
who abuse these substances (Babor, Caulkins et al., 2010; Babor, Room et al., 2010; 
Gunnlaugsson, 2002, 2013). The harm dependent users cause themselves and society in 
general can be massive and that is surely a problem that is worthy of further analysis. In this 
thesis the social cost of drug abuse will be considered with respect to public policy 
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intervention. Economic justification for such interference is based on preventing cost not 
taken into account by the decision maker, whether it is private or external cost. Therefore, the 
private cost of financing the drug use is not relevant in this discussion as this cost is actually 
taken into account by the addicts. Perhaps it is even the only cost they do realize in their 
decision making.  
Drug abuse causes significant cost in several sectors of society. Firstly, drug abuse harms the 
actual drug users, for example in the form of reduced life quality and increased mortality for 
addicts. Reduced health as a result of drug use is both connected to physical and mental 
conditions. Examples of physical harm connected to drug use are cardiovascular diseases, 
lung diseases, various physical pain, death as a result of overdose, and infectious diseases 
such as hepatitis B and C and HIV. Examples of the mental harm often resulting from drug 
abuse are mental disorders such as personality disorders and depression. Secondly, drug use 
has negative impact on third parties and society as whole in the form of externalities. Society 
is burdened with costs such as cost of treatment, drug-related health care and social services, 
cost of police, judiciary, customs and prevention, as well as burglary, violence and traffic 
accidents caused by drug abusers.  
The focus in this thesis is primarily on illicit drugs, the social cost they generate, and the 
implication for policy justification. Therefore, unless stated otherwise, drugs refer to illicit 
drugs or substances. In this thesis the theoretical economic arguments for policy justification 
will be discussed, both based on the harm inflicted upon others (external costs) and self-harm 
(private cost). To enrich the discussion on policy implication it is important to have rough 
estimates of the social cost generated by illicit drug consumption each year. This cost will be 
estimated for the case of Iceland in order to support the discussion of this thesis. Furthermore, 
supply-side policy has been a dominant strategy used to respond to the drug problem in 
Iceland and therefore it will give further insights to discuss it separately. However, as 
discussed in this thesis, it is not straightforward to estimate the benefits of drug control due to 
causal uncertainties. Even though it is possible to account for various uncertainties in social 
cost estimates connected to drug abuse, it is not as straightforward to estimate the benefits of 
drug control.  
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2 The drug problem and the Icelandic 
context 
Drug abuse is a global phenomenon and many of its causes and results are universal. 
However, the core of the problem varies for different nations. That is, whether the actual drug 
consumption, trafficking or other aspects of the problem generate the most societal harm 
(Babor, Caulkins et al., 2010; Babor, Room et al., 2010). In spite of some globally common 
trends each society has its own characteristics regarding the drug problem. In this section the 
problem will be discussed with respect to Iceland. That is, the extent of drug use, social 
characteristics of users, societal attitudes and response to the problem.  
2.1 The extent of drug use in Iceland 
It was only around 1970 that drugs were first observed in Iceland. Since then the local media 
has often discussed increased consumption among young people, massive drug seizures, 
numerous arrests for smuggling and distribution, and prolonged prison sentences. Drug abuse 
is not particularly widespread in the Icelandic community, but it is still considerable. The 
number of individuals caught driving under the influence of illicit drugs has increased 
considerably over past few years, i.e. a 67% increase between 2012 and 2013 (Gunnlaugsson, 
2013). 
Heroin has never gained sizable foothold in the Icelandic drug market and it has only 
occasionally been seized in small doses. For example, only 1 gram of heroin was seized by 
the police and customs office in the year 2013 and before that it was last seized in 2007 in the 
amount of 12 grams. Cannabis is by far the most common drug in Iceland, next is 
amphetamine and then cocaine (Ríkislögreglustjórinn, 2014). According to a health 
directorate study from 2012 more than every forth individual who had tried other drugs than 
cannabis had used them in the past 12 months (Embætti landlæknis, 2013). Figure 1 shows 
the proportion of Icelandic people who have tried or consumed each type of illicit drugs 
according to the health directorate study. 
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Figure 1. Illicit drug consumption among Icelanders aged 18-67 years. Source: Embætti landlæknis, 2013 
 
The use of cannabis, the most frequently used drug in Iceland, is regularly measured among 
young students. However, not much is known about how that consumption develops into 
adulthood. Because cannabis use among adults is less examined little is known about whether 
consumption starting at young age is constant, increasing or decreasing (Gunnlaugsson, 
2013). Studies have shown that cannabis consumption in Iceland is concentrated within 
younger age groups which causes some concern. Regular use of this particular substance is 
however negligible among adults which indicates the consumption to be temporary and 
experimental (Gunnlaugsson, 2013). 
In 2013 approximately 23-30% of the Icelandic population claimed to have tried cannabis, 
depending on the sample (Embætti landlæknis, 2013; Gunnlaugsson, 2013). Less than 10% 
claimed to have tried it more than 10 times, and nearly 3% to have tried it in the last six 
months. Cannabis consumption appears more common among men than women as 28% of 
Icelandic men have tried it compared to 19% of women. Furthermore, 11% of men had tried it 
more than 10 times compared to only 5% of women, and 4% of men had used it in the last six 
months compared to 1% of women (Gunnlaugsson, 2013). These results may possibly 
underestimate the extent of drug use in the Icelandic society, but they still give an idea about 
the magnitude and properties of the consumption. Even though cannabis use is not 
particularly widespread in the society the number of Icelanders who have tried cannabis has 
been increasing in recent years, for example compared to similar statistics from 2002. Over 
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19% of adult Icelanders (aged 18-74) claimed to have tried cannabis in 2002, only 6% 
admitted to have tried it more than 10 times, and about 2% to have used it in the last six 
months. Same statistics from 1997 are nearly the same as in 2002 which indicates that the 
increase in cannabis consumption is recent (Gunnlaugsson, 2008, 2013). Figure 2 shows the 
distribution of cannabis consumption by different age groups in Iceland. The figure shows the 
concentration in the younger age groups, especially when it comes to more regular cannabis 
consumption which again indicates a more active consumption among the younger 
generations (Gunnlaugsson, 2013).  
 
Figure 2. The percentage of Icelandic adults who had tried cannabis in 2013 by age group. Source: 
Gunnlaugsson, 2013. 
 
A health directorate study from 2102 estimated that around 6% of adult Icelandic people have 
experienced alcohol or drug addiction sometime in their lifetime (Gudlaugsson, Magnusson 
and Jonsson, 2014). Of those who sought help at Vogur in 2009 (the most active treatment 
institution in Iceland) 40% sought help due to alcohol addiction, 20% due to a mix of alcohol 
and other drugs, 17% due to cannabis, 12% due to amphetamine, and 3% due to cocaine. The 
share of patients with alcohol problems has been decreasing steadily, in 1995 67% of patients 
were struggling with alcohol addiction. Most radical changes have been within the youngest 
patient group. That is, in 1995 46% of patients younger than twenty were admitted with 
alcohol problems, but in 2009 this rate was 10%. The proportion of patient who had problems 
with alcohol mixed with other substances has been quite stable, i.e. 25% in 1995 and 21% in 
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2009. In 2009 48% of patients under twenty were in treatment for cannabis addiction and 17% 
for amphetamine compared to 23% and 6% in 1995 (SÁÁ, 2010).  
2.2 Social characteristics of users 
It is known that the risk of developing substance abuse is greatest in the period of 
adolescence. Drug dependence problems are however only developed by the minority of those 
who try illicit drugs. Drug problems are more often than not connected to other severe social 
problems. Those who have problems with drug dependence are more likely to be young males 
with family history of substance abuse, violent or criminal behaviour, and mental health 
problems (Babor, Caulkins et al., 2010; Babor, Room et al., 2010). The social reality of illicit 
drug consumption in Iceland and its mechanisms are no exception from these general trends.  
The results of Gunnlaugsson (2013) indicate that drug consumption in Iceland is negligible 
when looking at society as a whole and that regular consumption and drug abuse is only a 
problem among specific marginal groups in society. Illicit drug use in Iceland consists 
primarily of temporary experimental or sociable consumption of cannabis among young 
adults. That is, tampering that does not lead to addiction. Regarding the concentration of 
cannabis consumption among young people it has to be kept in mind that the negative effects 
of cannabis are more harmful for younger consumers (Gunnlaugsson, 2013; Johns, 2001). 
This might reinforce the society’s concern and the hostility of older generations towards drug 
use. A large proportion of young people seems ready to try illicit drugs, but most stop using 
as they grow older. Still some continue using illicit drugs as they grow older but to a much 
smaller extent, others become active and long term users. Some of the individuals who try 
cannabis develop abuse of various harder substances, and many times alcohol too 
(Gunnlaugsson, 2013).  
Not much is known about the social characteristics of those who abuse hard drugs, but they 
seem to be in a weak social position and facing various other problems (Gunnlaugsson, 2013). 
Arrest reports, both from Iceland and other countries, reflect this social pattern of addicts. 
Vast majority of arrestees for drug-related offense are either unemployed or unskilled, and 
more so then the norm of the society. For example, almost half of those arrested by the 
Icelandic narcotics police in the late 20th century were unemployed at time when the 
unemployment rate in Iceland was extremely low (Gunnlaugsson, 2013; Gunnlaugsson and 
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Galliher, 2000). Addicts injecting themselves with illicit drugs are probably those who suffer 
most from their addiction. An Icelandic study on injection users in rehab in 2013 suggests that 
these addicts are more likely to have disability, limited work experience, only primary school 
education, be arrested or charged for crime, suffer from mental illness, have hepatitis or HIV, 
and suffer from suicidal thoughts (Gunnlaugsson, 2013).  
2.3 Icelandic attitude towards drug abuse 
Iceland is of course an island rather far away from other countries, it has a small population 
and the society is relatively homogeneous. Furthermore, the community reacts strongly to any 
external risk. This can explain why studies indicate that the fear of drugs is greater in Iceland 
than in other countries. Like elsewhere many of the more serious crimes are committed by 
individuals high on drugs or because of their drug problem, the same is true for alcohol. The 
public therefore considers these substances, especially drugs, to be the root of the crime-
related problems in Iceland (Gunnlaugsson, 2013). According to all but one surveys on public 
attitude Icelanders believe drug abuse to be the most serious crime problem in the society. 
The ratio varies with time, but overall about third to half of the Icelandic nation considers 
drugs and drug use to be the greatest crime problem in Iceland. Figure 3 shows the 
distribution of the public opinion towards crime in different survey years.  
 
Figure 3. Type of crime considered the most problematic for Iceland. Source: Gunnlaugsson, 2013. 
Furthermore, Icelanders consider alcohol and drug use to be the most important drive for 
criminal behaviour, i.e. why people end up in crime. A strong majority (54-73%) believes that 
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criminal offense in Iceland is mostly caused by alcohol and drug abuse, and over half consider 
drug abuse to be a greater social problem than alcohol abuse (Gunnlaugsson, 2013).  
According to Figure 3 it was only in 2013 that slightly higher percent of Icelanders 
considered sexual offense to be a more serious crime problem than drugs. That is, 36% 
compared to 33% believed it to be the greatest crime problem in Iceland. It is interesting to 
note that in 2013 the media coverage in Iceland was dominated by discussion of sexual 
offense where several old and horrid cases were brought to light. Likewise in 2012 economic 
crime was in the spotlight after the economic crisis in Iceland and in that year 31% of people 
believed it to be the most serious crime problem. Therefore, the media seems to have great 
influence on public attitudes, which might indicate the problem to be somewhat exaggerated. 
However it is hard to identify whether these profound concerns of the public are caused by the 
media or not (Gunnlaugsson, 2013). The problem surely exist, but the public might be ill 
informed. Studies have shown that alcohol, a legal substance, can be at least as harmful as 
illicit drugs if not worse (Babor, Caulkins et al., 2010; Babor, Room et al., 2010; Miller, 
Levy, Cohen and Cox, 2006; Room, 2006). Still the Icelandic population has much more 
negative attitudes towards drugs which is plausibly due to how dominating drugs are in the 
Icelandic underworld. That is, with the rise of the drug market serious or violent crimes have 
become more common and brutal, crimes that used to be unheard of in the Icelandic society.  
Drugs are considered the most serious crime problem in Iceland as well as the most important 
source of criminal activity. This clearly reflects how seriously the population in general views 
the presence of drugs in the Icelandic society. The public in general seems to share the 
concern of authorities regarding the invasion of drugs and therefore supports more extensive 
interventions aimed at reducing the drug problem. Measures such as authorized house search, 
phone bugs and monitoring, and information buying by the police to facilitate drug 
investigation has generally been supported in public attitude surveys (Gunnlaugsson, 2000, 
2013). Opposition to the legalization of cannabis, among the public and politicians, has also 
been substantial according to surveys. The general hostile public attitude towards drugs in 
Iceland has probably contributed to reducing the spread of drugs in its society (Embætti 
landlæknis, 2013; Gunnlaugsson, 2013).  
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2.4 Response to the problem 
As previously mentioned, illicit drugs did not appear in Iceland until around 1970. A special 
narcotics police was established in 1971 and two years later an independent drug court was 
established. It was clear from the start that authorities intended to respond firmly to this new 
threat (Gunnlaugsson, 2013; Gunnlaugsson and Galliher, 2000). As discussed in the previous 
subsections the public in Iceland seems to have worried as much about the drug problem 
through the years as the authorities. Society members are concerned that the problem will 
grow and become unmanageable. Even though illicit drug consumption has a relatively small 
spread in society there seems to be a reason to respond, especially in the case of the most 
vulnerable drug users. Icelandic authorities, public and media have responded harshly to the 
drug-problem, which has possibly constrained the spread of illicit drugs even more 
(Gunnlaugsson, 2013). The most important success factor of Icelandic drug policy might be 
preventing heroin, which is a particularly harmful drug, from entering the country and gaining 
foothold in Icelandic drug markets. This is in line with the conclusion of Caulkins and Reuter 
(2010), and Pollack and Reuter (2014) which claims the main effect of restrictive policies is 
preventing establishment of new drug markets (discussed further in section 4.1 and 8.2.2.).  
Drug-related public interventions in Iceland can broadly be divided into two different 
categories. Firstly, milder interventions such as school-based prevention, providing 
information and education, especially aimed at the Icelandic youth. Secondly, tougher and 
more radical interventions, especially carried out by the criminal justice system 
(Gunnlaugsson, 2013; Gunnlaugsson and Galliher, 2000). Restrictive policies are most 
common in Iceland as in other western societies. Import, production, possession, handling, 
distribution and sale of drugs is punishable by law. The society is considered responsible for 
protecting public interest (e.g. their health and safety) through strict interventions and 
prohibition (Gunnlaugsson, 2013). The police and customs have various monitoring at 
Iceland’s ports and boarders, the number of specialized narcotics police officers has 
increased, and cooperation between public entities has become more persistent 
(Gunnlaugsson, 2013; Ríkisendurskoðun, 2010). Those smuggling illicit drugs across the 
Icelandic boarders are most commonly aged 18-22 years and a vast majority of smugglers are 
male. Number of seizures of amphetamine and ecstasy by the customs control has increased 
recently while number of seizures of cocaine and cannabis has decreased (Tollstjóri, 2014). 
When looking at the number of seizures recorded by the national police it can be seen that the 
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relative distribution of the number of seizures has been quite stable in the most recent years. 
That is, for 2011-2013 most of the recorded cases are of cannabis, a close second regarding 
number of seizures is amphetamine, the third is either cocaine, cannabis plants or tobacco 
mixed cannabis depending on the year (Ríkislögreglustjórinn, 2014). This distribution of 
seizures is more or less in line with the distribution of illicit drug consumption in Iceland as 
well as the distribution of treatment patients at Vogur.  
Punishment for drug-related crime has been increased and sentences for those crimes have 
been prolonging as the crimes grow more serious. About one third of prisoners in Iceland are 
incarcerated for drug-related crime, i.e. for production, import and/or distribution of drugs, 
but this proportion was less than 10% twenty years ago (Gunnlaugsson, 2011). This 
proportion does not account for those imprisoned for other offense connected to drug abuse, 
i.e. theft, burglary and violence related to drugs. Therefore, the drug-related crime problem is 
more extensive than this proportion of prisoners indicates (Gunnlaugsson, 2013; 
Ríkisendurskoðun, 2010). Additionally, police interference regarding drug consumption is 
quite common. Many have police records for possession and acquisition of illicit drugs, 
mainly cannabis. The national police recorded about 1.500 offenses of this type in the year 
2013, which was about 27,7% more instances of possession and acquisition than in 2011 
(Gunnlaugsson, 2013; Ríkislögreglustjórinn, 2014). In 2013 offenses for moving illicit drugs 
between countries were 176, offenses for drug production were 167, and 257 for sale and 
distribution. In 2013 the total number of offenses recorded by the police was 53.255 
(Ríkislögreglustjórinn, 2014).  
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3 Theoretical arguments for public policy 
interventions 
The total cost borne by the whole society as a result of an action, e.g. production or 
consumption of a good or service, is the social cost of that particular action. This social cost 
consists of two other cost concepts, i.e. private cost and external cost. Private cost is the cost 
borne by those engaging in the action while external cost is the economic cost imposed on 
unrelated third parties as a result of that action. Social cost of an action is therefore the sum of 
the private and external costs adjusting for transfers within society (French, Rachal and 
Hubbard, 1991). The distinction between social cost, external cost and transfers is important 
(Røgeberg, 2012). Not all actions lead to external costs and in that case private cost is equal to 
social cost. This is not the case for illicit drug consumption as much of the drug-related cost 
burden is borne by other members of society. Social cost estimates must therefore include 
both the private cost borne by the illicit drug consumers and the external cost their drug 
consumption imposes on others.  
The distinction between private and external cost is especially important in policy 
consideration because it explains differently the reasoning behind estimating these costs 
(Røgeberg, 2012). In this thesis private cost and external cost are emphasized separately while 
discussing the social cost imposed on the Icelandic society due to illicit drug use. This 
separation of the social cost concept is consider more relevant in the following discussion 
since each of the two provides its own theoretical argument for upholding drug policy. 
According to economic theory various situations give support for public policy intervention as 
a tool for increasing welfare in the economy. Economic reasoning generally justifies policy 
intervention by showing that the intervention, e.g. taxes or regulation, increases the welfare of 
society members. Public policy intervention based on private cost arguments can be 
rationalized by looking at the theory of behavioural economics. Support for public policy 
intervention based on external cost arguments can be rationalized by the more (neo)classical 
welfare economic theory (Røgeberg, 2007). These separate arguments for policy intervention 
in drug markets will be discussed in the next two subsections.  
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3.1 Behavioural arguments related to private cost 
From a (neo)classical economic perspective, which has been the most prominent within the 
discipline, there is a lack of evidence for public policy interventions based on private cost 
arguments. Policy intervention in the absence of externalities (externalities are discussed in 
section 3.2) contradicts the traditional understanding of consumer sovereignty and are deemed 
paternalistic. That is, protecting people from their own bad choices has not been considered 
an acceptable reasoning for policy intervention (Røgeberg, 2007). One of the core 
assumptions has been perfect rationality where individuals make the best available choices in 
each situation (Furubotn og Richter, 2005, pp. 3-12; Røgeberg, 2007). As rational choice has 
been dominating within economics it has also influenced behavioural economics (see section 
3.1.2). Therefore rationality, rational addiction and some of its criticism will be discussed 
briefly before discussing the behavioural theory that is more accepting of public policy 
intervention. 
3.1.1 Rational addiction theory and its drawbacks 
According to rationality the consumer takes long term consumption decisions and 
incorporates the future in his decision making. This entails that he uses the best available 
information in a correct way, knows his future preferences and agrees with them, and weighs 
different periods in a time consistent way. Under these assumptions a rational consumer 
cannot be better off by public policy intervention because he is never prone to decision 
failure. Therefore, intervention is only supported when there is harm to others (external costs) 
which seems rather narrow (Røgeberg, 2007). This assumption has not described actual 
behaviour well enough historically and it seems more realistic to allow each individual to 
perceive his surroundings differently, positively and normatively, based on his own 
experiences (North, 1994). Theory of rational choice and consumer sovereignty does therefore 
not describe ordinary people well enough. In reality harmful decisions and actions do occur 
especially for addictive goods such as drugs, tobacco and alcohol (Bernheim and Rangel, 
2004; Henden, Melberg and Røgeberg, 2013; Røgeberg, 2007, 2012). According to rationality 
individuals take into account the risk of becoming dependent and should therefore be allowed 
to take the involved risks if they choose to do so, how irrational their behaviour may seem 
(Røgeberg, 2007).  
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Rational addiction theory can be traced back to Becker who extended consumer theory to 
sociological phenomena such as sex, marriage, family, divorce, childbirth rate, education, 
racism, crime and addiction. According to his theories everything can be analysed by looking 
at net benefit and utility because the same incentives as in classical consumer theory are the 
driving force behind all individual decision making (Ekelund Jr and Hébert, 2007, pp. 589-
600). Addictive behaviour is therefore nothing more than ordinary behaviour which needs no 
additional or different explanation than consumer theory for non-addictive goods (Buck, 
Godfrey and Sutton, 1996; Henden et al., 2013). According to rational addiction theory all 
addiction is due to fully rational choices and therefore all addiction is rational. Well-informed, 
forward-looking individuals plan their consumption whether it is consumption of tobacco, 
alcohol, drugs, food, TV, fitness or other goods. Consumers know what choices they will face 
in the future, know what choices they will want to make and agree with these choices (Becker 
and Murphy, 1988; Røgeberg, 2007). Becker and Murphy (1988) interpret gradually 
increasing consumption (dependence) of addictive goods as a rational implementation of the 
optimal lifetime consumption schedule of that good. According to rational addiction theory 
there is no reason to prohibit, regulate or prevent consumption of addictive goods such as 
drugs unless there are negative externalities present (Becker and Murphy, 1988; Buck et al., 
1996; Røgeberg, 2007). According to rational addiction theory drug abusers who are unhappy 
with their consumption would be even unhappier if they were not consuming the good they 
are addicted to (Becker and Murphy, 1988; Henden et al., 2013). Some view rational 
addiction theory as a success, but it is quite controversial. It has been criticized for making too 
strong rationality assumptions for addicts, i.e. assuming them to be capable of responding to 
incentives while forming a rational long term drug-use plan. This plan is furthermore assumed 
to take account what consequences their current (and future) drug consumption will have for 
their future tastes for drug consumption which is rather unrealistic (Melberg and Røgeberg, 
2010). Henden et al. (2013) view rational addiction theory as theoretically implausible and 
empirically false as hesitation and irrationality seem to be a prevalent part of addictive 
behaviour. Rationality is perhaps more applicable for non-addictive goods, but for addictive 
goods it completely overlooks real problems faced by addicts such as their experience of inner 
conflict and lack of self-control. Therefore, the policy-implication of rational addiction theory 
cannot be taken too seriously (Røgeberg, 2007). 
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3.1.2 Behavioural economics and addiction 
Behavioural economics is a more recent field within economics which has increasingly gained 
status within the discipline. The theory of behavioural economics modifies the assumptions 
and expands consumer theory with biological, psychological and philosophical factors. 
Looking at unhealthy consumption, such as substances, the rationality assumptions of 
consumer theory have been changed in particular. Alternative assumptions give more space 
for decision failure and better justify public policy interventions which have often been 
deemed paternalistic based on a more traditional economic theory. Behavioural economic 
theory takes into account that decision failure may occur and that the decision maker may 
need outside help in order to correct for it. The decision failure in question can for example be 
brought about due to self-control problems. In this situation policy intervention can be desired 
by the decision maker as a proxy for self-control. That is, the decision maker gets help to 
control himself while taking the decision which benefits him in the form of increased welfare 
(Røgeberg, 2007). This argument from behavioural economic theory is very relatable to drug 
consumption as behaviour can be compulsive where lack of self-control prevents individual 
decision makers from making choices they consider to be the most valuable course of action. 
Even though drug consumption is not the result of irresistible or invincible desires it is 
arguably compulsive in nature, the individual even knows that giving into the compulsive 
behaviour is a mistake while he is doing it (Henden et al., 2013). As noted by Henden et al. 
(2013), it is not impossible for addicts to refrain from drugs, but it is much harder for them 
than non-addicts. For compulsive individuals such as addicts there appears a disparity 
between the decisions and actions they take. This decision failure is an essential feature of 
compulsive behaviour as Henden et al. (2013) describe compulsive behavioural patterns as a 
regular and systematic failures in decision making with respect to actions taken. Therefore, 
they do not rule out intentional or voluntary addictive behaviour, but they also acknowledge 
other mechanisms (e.g. psychological, neurological or both) than incentive-sensation as a 
possible explanation for the compulsive behaviour of addicts. That is, they do not deem all 
drug-oriented behaviour as rational nor irresistible. Henden et al. (2013) conclude that 
behaviour can be voluntary, chosen and compulsive at the same time and that intentional 
effort alone is often insufficient to break out of drug-oriented behaviour patterns.  
Research of the philosopher Elster (e.g. 1997) has been influential for the theory of 
behavioural economics on addictive goods. He described addiction and the strategies people 
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use to deal with it from various perspectives. One of his focuses was on self-binding, i.e. the 
behaviour where the individual decision maker tries to comply with a desired action by 
preventing or constricting future actions or affecting future incentives (Røgeberg, 2007). 
Elster (1997) criticises rational addiction theory (discussed above) for the lack of attention to 
such forces that might cause decision failure. Behavioural arguments are strong arguments for 
regulating and reducing drug consumption for the sake of the actual drug users. As substance 
abusers, legal or illegal, often desire to quit and even regret ever starting (Nutt, King, 
Saulsbury and Blakemore, 2007; Røgeberg, 2012). Furthermore, many addicts appear to make 
conscious efforts to refrain themselves from drug consumption at the same time as they are 
carrying out drug-oriented behaviour (Henden et al., 2013). This kind of decision failure leads 
to private costs, explicit and/or implicit, for consumers of addictive goods which they would 
like to correct, but might be unable to do due to strong dependence or addiction (Røgeberg, 
2012). In spite of the behavioural arguments supporting public policy intervention it is more 
complicated to define the most appropriate way of intervening, this is discussed further in 
section 8. Even though an intervention is or can be beneficial from a behavioural economic 
standpoint the issue is more complex. The problem of finding the appropriate policy 
intervention is not only an economic issue, it is no less political or social in nature so many 
things have to be considered in such discussion (Røgeberg, 2012). 
Røgeberg (2007) points out three different theoretical arguments for why the individual 
decision maker could fail to take his desired decision. Welfare analysis becomes more 
demanding by taking these factors into account, but each model or argument provides its own 
insights to the policy discussion. Each decision failure argument has different implications for 
policy justification or recommendation as the decision failure in each situation is caused by 
different factors or underlying decision problems (Røgeberg, 2007). Each argument will be 
discussed in more detail in the following subsections.  
Present bias 
Firstly, individuals may be facing present bias which makes them give into temptation (and 
consume drugs) even though they will regret it later as they know beforehand that they would 
have preferred to refrain. Their bias towards the present makes them diminish the future regret 
in the decision process and choose bad consumption now as a result. This type of preference 
is reflected by hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic discounting of the future while traditional 
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economic theories often assume exponential discounting. With preference bias intertemporal 
trade off and assessment of future plans is affected by time, i.e. too much significance is put 
on what is desired in the present relative to the future. As the potential or perceived benefit 
gets closer in time its significance grows so much that it imbalances the relative benefits 
between time periods (Røgeberg, 2007, 2012). Within behavioural economics present bias has 
been used to explain procrastination and other delay of “unpleasant” choices such as dealing 
with addiction and unhealthy consumption (Frederick, Loewenstein and O'donoghue, 2002; 
Røgeberg, 2007). Regarding drug abuse the immediate benefits of drug consumption are 
exaggerated by the individual addict while making the consumption choice, at the same time 
he is systematically ignoring his longer-run goals or desired behaviour. When the opportunity 
for drug consumption occurs the estimated value of the consumption has increased so much 
for the individual decision maker relative to the value of refraining from drugs that his 
preference has reversed (Buck et al., 1996; Henden et al., 2013). Present bias is in a way an 
overestimation of present benefit relative to future cost. In behavioural economics it is 
common to assume that public policy can help individuals to make choices in accordance to 
their wishes or good intentions for the future, e.g. by taxes on unhealthy consumption or “sin 
taxes”. O'Donoghue and Rabin (2006) make a distinction between those who realize they will 
deviate from their plans for the future and those who do not and consequently do not account 
for their weakness. In both cases public policy intervention, such as taxes, can help 
individuals to improve their welfare. For example in the case of tobacco these individuals can 
be helped with special taxes to help them live in accordance to their smoking intentions. 
(O'Donoghue and Rabin, 2006; Røgeberg, 2007, 2012). Even though the individuals are still 
biased towards the present and put too little emphasis on the future the tax helps compensate 
for that bias. Theoretically the present bias arguments can also be used to support compulsory 
treatment of addicts as they would be better off afterwards. Even though it would be 
politically difficult to implement a policy based on the present bias argument (Røgeberg, 
2012) it is still relevant in the theoretical rationalization of drug control. 
Unstable preferences or choice capability  
Secondly, individuals may be faced with unstable preferences or choice capability. That is, 
that their taste or preferences are changing unexpectedly and they will not agree with the 
changes in hindsight. This problems is described by systematic changes with time in the way 
two given time periods are weighted against each other or compared which causes individuals 
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to deviate from their plans, i.e. from their desired action (Røgeberg, 2007). That is, there is a 
contradiction between present and future preferences as the individual is unable to predict the 
preferences he will use to make future choices. For addictive goods the brain ex ante predicts 
pleasure from substances and these predicted pleasures are far greater than the pleasures that 
will actually occur (ex post). Due to this individuals have problems with predicting their own 
taste changes and often underestimate the magnitude of these changes in preference. 
Therefore, individuals can be overwhelmed by the urge to do something that does not make 
any sense (Bernheim and Rangel, 2004; Røgeberg, 2007). This can explain addicts repeatedly 
and unwantedly engaging in compulsive substance abuse despite knowing the obvious harm 
and their own desire to refrain from using (Bernheim and Rangel, 2004). In the case of 
tobacco individuals suffering from this kind of decision failure might be worse off with a 
special tax on tobacco. In addition to buying excessive amounts of tobacco regardless of the 
price they also have to pay high taxes. When they buy obsessively anyways the tax does not 
help them reduce their consumption and correct the problem of unstable preferences or choice 
capability (Bernheim and Rangel, 2004; Røgeberg, 2007, 2012). In the worst cases the 
smoker has zero joy or benefit of smoking, but cannot help himself due to the addiction. In 
this case taxes would only increase his cost burden as he is unable to change his consumption 
pattern (Røgeberg, 2012). 
Social interaction and multiple equilibria  
Thirdly, individuals can be faced with social interaction and multiple equilibria. If they are 
strongly influenced by those around them it can fortify undesired behaviour as norms and 
traditions. By incorporating social impact in decision making behavioural economics have 
made possible a situation where there exists a suboptimal (i.e. undesired) equilibria. In this 
case groups can be locked in situations or equilibria that is undesired. Even if there exists a 
preferred or better equilibria that everyone would be better off in the group cannot move to 
the desired equilibria without coordination. Here it is the average behaviour of society or a 
smaller group that impacts the decision making of each individual. For example, a non-
smoker’s sensitivity for smoking depends on the extent of smoking in society or his social 
group (Røgeberg, 2007). In Akerlof’s (1997) model individual behaviour is determined by 
what is perceived as ideal behaviour, and from the behaviour of others in the same social 
group. Therefore, the entire group can maintain the undesired behaviour (bad equilibria) 
because no one wants to deviate from the group, even though everyone wants to behave 
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differently (be in the good equilibria) (Akerlof 1997; Røgeberg, 2007). The bad equilibria can 
even be so fortified by the social interaction that the group cannot switch equilibria without 
outside help. In this case public policy can be used to coordinate expectations and behaviour 
so the better equilibria may be achieved (Røgeberg, 2007).  
3.2 Welfare arguments related to external cost 
Traditionally it is believed that an individual makes decisions by weighing the costs and 
benefits this decision will cause himself. External effects or externalities occur when this 
decision or action also has impact on third parties and the individual does not take that impact 
into consideration while making the decision (or taking that action) (Røgeberg, 2012). 
Externalities can be positive or negative, but external cost is generally the result of a negative 
externality. That is, when this external cost is imposed on nonparticipants the social cost of an 
activity exceeds the private cost borne by those who engage in the activity. External costs are 
directly linked to production or consumption of a particular good or service, but the producer 
or consumer does not account for this cost in his decision making. Therefore, too much of the 
good is produced or consumed in the sense that it would be socially optimal to reduce the 
quantity. In this case the regular market forces, supply and demand, fail to maximize welfare 
for the society as a whole resulting in economic inefficiencies. The socially efficient rate of 
output can only be generated by also taking external cost into account in the consumption (or 
production) decision process (Ekelund Jr and Hébert, 2007; Mankiw and Taylor, 2006; 
Røgeberg, 2007). A widely used example of negative externalities is factory emitting 
hazardous waste that has adverse effects for the surrounding environment and population. 
3.2.1 Coase theorem 
Theoretically, many issues related to externalities can be solved through negotiation as 
explained by the so called Coase theorem. Coase (1960) emphasized mutual or bilateral 
nature of external effects. That is, that both parties could be responsible for the presence of an 
externality, but what matters is the property right to cause or avoid the externality in question. 
Given clearly defined property rights the different parties should be able to negotiate, and buy 
rights from each other, until the social optimum would be reached (Coase, 1960; Ekelund Jr 
and Hébert, 2007). In this case, public policy intervention would be unnecessary and not 
improve the society’s welfare. Theoretically, illicit drug consumers could negotiate with other 
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members of society and pay for the right to abuse drugs until the “optimal” amount of drug 
abuse would be reached. This absurd example is purely theoretical and it contradicts the 
discussion of section 3.1.2, i.e. that drug consumers do not necessarily desire the amount of 
drugs they end up consuming. However, this example helps clarify the theoretical reasoning 
behind public intervention based on externalities. Without transaction costs public policy 
intervention could never outperform private negotiation, but as noted by Coase (1960) 
himself, that situation is only theoretical as transaction costs are inherent in most actions. 
Furthermore, if transaction costs are high it is costly and difficult for the involved parties to 
negotiate with each other. High transaction costs outweigh the benefits of the negotiation, and 
the optimal solution cannot be reached (Coase, 1960; Røgeberg, 2012). In this case welfare in 
the society could increase as a result of public policy intervention. If the intervention manages 
to correct for the externality, i.e. incorporate the external cost into the decision making, the 
society as a whole is better off (Røgeberg, 2012).  
3.2.2 Externalities as a rationalization for public policy 
As mentioned in the previous section (3.1), neoclassical assumptions in economics assume 
consumers to be rational, i.e. that they are well informed and take the best choices possible at 
each time (Furubotn and Richter, 2005, pp. 3-12; Røgeberg, 2007). In this type of world the 
only rationalization of public policy intervention is external effects. That is, in the presence of 
external costs the price of particular good is too low, since external costs are not accounted 
for, and the quantity of that good is higher than socially optimal causing the market failure 
(Ekelund Jr and Hébert, 2007). In this case the socially efficient rate of output can only be 
generated by taking external cost into account as well. According to neoclassical economic 
theory this can be corrected by imposing a special tax on the decision maker in order to make 
him take responsibility for the negative impact his decision has on the welfare of other society 
members. This is assumed to restore efficiency, as long as the negative external effects can be 
quantified they can be incorporated into the price of the good causing the decision maker to 
choose what is optimal for the whole society (Ekelund Jr and Hébert, 2007; Røgeberg, 2007).  
A common policy instrument for correcting consumption-based externalities are taxes. In that 
case the taxes force the decision maker to take into account the external cost his actions 
impose on others and efficiency is restored. This type of reasoning has been prominent when 
it comes to justifying extra taxes on tobacco and alcohol (Røgeberg, 2007). In economics this 
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type of correcting tax is known as the Pigouvian tax. Theoretically the Pigouvian tax is 
considered the most efficient way to properly correct for external cost or negative 
externalities. Given that the value of the external cost is known the tax provides the right 
incentive to the decision maker to reduce the external cost to the efficient level. That is, the 
external cost is not necessarily fully eliminated, but it is reduced to the level where the one 
causing it takes into account all consequences of his decisions (Røgeberg, 2007). This type of 
public policy instrument is however not feasible when it comes to illicit drugs as public 
authorities have no direct influence on the price of drugs and cannot collect taxes on illegal 
consumption. Therefore, other policy instruments have to be considered in order to correct for 
the negative externalities given by illicit drug consumption. 
The policy argument based on external costs is the one that has been the strongest within the 
economic discipline as well as receiving understanding outside the field (Røgeberg, 2007, 
2012). In the case of illicit drug use the externalities are consequences for others which the 
decision maker, the illicit drug consumer, does not take into account in his decision process, 
his consumption choice. Theoretically the externalities are identified by all the costs, tangible 
and intangible, which third parties bear as a result of an action taken by another individual. In 
this sense purely personal feelings of discomfort could be included in the discussion. These 
external costs are not only difficult to quantify, but they are arguably insignificant or 
uninteresting in the analysis (Røgeberg, 2007, 2012). Economic theory does not explain why 
or how welfare of others is effected through externalities, but it explains how these 
externalities can be corrected for once they have been identified and quantified (Røgeberg, 
2007). Based on that, given correct estimation, the optimal quantity of drugs would be 
realized. That is, the amount policy makers should aim their policy interventions at achieving. 
When estimating external cost of illicit drug consumption and discussing the external cost 
argument for public policy intervention the question of interest is what would the drug 
consumer himself choose to consume if he would take into account the external cost his 
consumption puts on other members of society (Røgeberg, 2012). This is expected to differ 
between drug types as different drugs have different external consequences. Furthermore, 
many of the external cost of drug consumption is generated in the publicly funded health and 
legal system, and no tax benefits offset these costs. The net cost-effect of drug consumption is 
thus expected to be negative, i.e. drugs cost society more than they give to those who benefit. 
Therefore, given that drugs stay illegal and no taxes can be gained from their consumption, it 
is expected that the socially optimal amount for the most harmful or socially costly drugs 
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would be zero. For those drugs, no consumption could even be the optimal case in spite of 
potential tax revenue due to legalization.  
Additional argument for estimating the external cost separately is the focus of this thesis on 
supply-side drug policy. To evaluate quantity reducing policy response for quantity control it 
is undoubtedly helpful to have some estimates of the annual external cost of the most 
common drugs, i.e. cannabis, amphetamine and cocaine. The link, or the causal relationship, 
between quantity reduction and external cost reduction is however not straightforward. These 
estimates can still be helpful in speculation regarding potential cost saving and plausible 
policy emphasis. Moreover, it is other members of the society that fund most of the 
prevention and policy measures, directly or indirectly. Therefore is it natural to put some 
focus on cost borne by them, not only the drug users themselves, i.e. the external cost not only 
the private cost. The private expenditure on drugs by the users is redundant in the analysis as 
the results are aimed at providing a discussion on public policy (Moore, 2007). That is, public 
policy intervention is based on preventing cost not taken into account by the decision maker, 
whether it is private or external. Therefore, the amounts spent on buying drugs is not relevant 
in the discussion of this thesis. The cost of financing drug consumption is the cost the addicts 
actually realize and consider in their decision making, and perhaps even the only cost they do 
consider.  
 
  
22 
 
 
23 
 
4 Strategies and interventions for 
controlling drugs 
Drug abuse is a common problem in many, if not most, societies who try to keep it at bay or 
supress it with various tools. These strategies and policy interventions are all part of how 
society responds to drug problems. Supply-side policy, the sub-focus of this thesis, is only 
one of the tools of contemporary drug policy. Criminal sanctions, drug interdiction, 
specialized drug treatment, school-based prevention programs, prescription management 
programmes and many other are used in the attempt to deal with the adverse effects often 
related to illicit drug consumption (Babor, Caulkins et al., 2010; Babor, Room et al., 2010). In 
most democracies prohibition and its enforcement has been the dominant strategy in the fight 
against drugs and drug-related problems. Where both possession, consumption and 
distribution of illicit drugs have been punishable by law (Gunnlaugsson, 2002; Pollack and 
Reuter, 2014). Additionally, sale and distribution of some of the chemicals needed to produce 
heroin and methamphetamine have been strictly regulated by most nations. One of the policy 
interventions favoured by authorities has been supply-side enforcement, i.e. policy aimed at 
producers, sellers and others in the supply-chain for drugs. It is generally assumed that higher 
prices and less availability of drugs are the results of tougher enforcement (Pollack and 
Reuter, 2014). These expectations are in line with the economic law of supply and demand 
(discussed further in subsection 8.2.1).  
How the drug problem is defined depends on the nation as the problem is connected to 
different harms in different societies. That is, for some the consumption is the main problem 
while for others it is the trafficking that has the worst effect. Where trafficking causes the 
most harm the problem is mainly a problem for law enforcement (e.g. in Nigeria), but where 
the use itself is the main issue the problem becomes a matter of social policy (e.g. in Sweden 
and Iceland). Therefore, it is no wonder that no single drug policy approach is deemed the 
most appropriate at all times and for all countries (Babor, Caulkins et al., 2010; Babor, Room 
et al., 2010). Regardless of the limited information on how to prioritize policy, considerable 
resources are spent on interventions tended to minimize drugs and their harmful effects 
(Moore, 2007). Babor, Caulkins et al. (2010) identify three broad policy targets and five 
major drug policy approaches based on their specific aims and broader goals. The broad 
targets of policy interventions are prevention of drug consumption, services that help heavy 
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drug users change their behaviour, and supply control policies (incarceration, customs etc.) 
(Babor, Caulkins et al., 2010; Babor, Room et al., 2010). The drug policy strategies and 
interventions of Babor, Caulkins et al. (2010) are described in Table 1, each of them has its 
advantages and disadvantages. Supply control will be discussed further here below as supply-
side policy is the sub-focus of this thesis.  
Table 1. Drug control strategies and interventions categorized by targeted policy and broader policy goals. 
  Policy targets Broad policy goals 
Prevention School-based drug prevention 
programs, mass media campaigns, 
reduce access for youth through 
policing 
Change attitudes, improve health 
literacy, and prevent drug use 
Services for 
drug users 
Opiate substitution therapy 
(methadone and buprenorphine), 
counselling, therapeutic communities, 
coerced abstinence through 
probation/parole supervision, needle 
exchange programs, peer-support 
groups 
Reduce use, improve health, reduce 
crime and overdose deaths, prevent 
spread of human immunodeﬁciency 
virus infection, treat psychiatric 
disorders 
Supply control Arrest trafﬁckers/dealers, force 
suppliers to operate in inefﬁcient ways 
Keep prices high and reduce 
availability 
Prescription 
regimes 
Regulate pharmaceutical companies, 
pharmacists and physicians 
Allow  psychoactive substances to be 
consumed for approved purposes, 
prevent use for non-approved purposes 
Criminal 
sanctions 
Increase penalties for drug possession 
and use, decrease penalties for some 
types of drug use (e.g. cannabis) 
Deter drug use; prevent normalization 
and contagious spread of drug use. 
Prevent negative effects of 
criminalizing less harmful forms of 
drug use 
Source: Babor, Caulkins et al., 2010; Babor, Room et al., 2010. 
 
4.1 Supply-side policy as a strategic response 
Supply-side enforcement involves many types of public policy interventions where each has 
its own different objective. That is, different supply-side interventions target specific parts of 
the supply chain for illicit drugs (Pollack and Reuter, 2014). Supply-side policy (supply 
control) targets production, distribution and sale of illicit substances and controls chemicals 
used to produce certain drug types. It also involves enforcing law, arrest and incarceration of 
drug dealers at all levels of the supply chain. The bulk of public spending on drug control is 
dedicated to supply-side interventions such as these mentioned here (Babor, Caulkins et al., 
2010, pp. 139-162; Babor, Room et al., 2010). However, researchers have failed to find strong 
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empirical evidence to support these interventions. Failure to show an impact on drug supply 
or drug prices, which should take place according to the law of supply and demand, leads to 
the conclusion that supply-side control does not give a return in accordance to what is spent 
on it (Caulkins and Reuter, 2010; Pollack and Reuter, 2014). There are no adequate guidelines 
for supply-side policy and law enforcement efforts due to lack of data and careful research on 
the matter. Babor, Caulkins et al. (2010) specify several reasons for this lack of evidence or 
reasons for why supply-side policy seems to go wrong. Firstly, there is a lack of empirical 
evidence showing that a global supply-control strategy has a significant effect on drug use in 
the societies consuming the most. Secondly, there is a lack of consistency in data. Therefore, 
the impact of strategies such as crop eradication, interdiction, precursor control and other 
interventions far up the supply chain cannot be estimated accurately. Thirdly, little evidence 
exists on the return on punishing high-level dealers and returns to extended periods of 
imprisonment are probably diminishing. Finally, street level enforcement is probably 
incapable of significantly reducing drug consumption as the number of sellers is too large 
(Babor, Caulkins et al., 2010, pp. 139-162; Babor, Room et al., 2010). Regarding the last 
point, supply control at the boarders might be more effective than street level control, 
especially in preventing new types of illicit drugs from gaining foothold (Caulkins and 
Reuter, 2010; Pollack and Reuter, 2014). However, in spite of its limited effect on prices and 
availability, supply-side drug policy can have a significant impact on other crucial factors of 
the drug problem. That is, it may be fundamental in reducing or controlling harm associated 
with drug markets (e.g. crime), give dependent users the incentive to get the help and service 
provided for them, and responding to the moral policy preferences of society in general (or 
the majority) (Babor, Caulkins et al., 2010, pp. 139-162; Babor, Room et al., 2010). 
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5 Method and framework 
In order to estimate the scope of the social cost generated by illicit drug abuse in Iceland a lot 
of data is required. Due to distinct characteristics for different societies it is risky to assign 
foreign results to the Icelandic context. Social structure, culture, legal environment and 
institutional structure have a great influence on the extent of the social cost of illicit drug 
abuse. To obtain the social cost estimates used to support the discussion of this thesis the 
results of an Icelandic study by Matthíasson (2010) have been adjusted to better fit the 
analysis of this thesis. Matthíasson (2010) estimates the social cost burden generated by 
alcohol and drug abuse in Iceland on average each year. In order to isolate the cost associated 
with illicit drug abuse the calculations of Matthíasson (2010) are modified and updated when 
needed, the resulting estimates are derived and summarized in section 6 and 7. Some cost 
elements estimated by Matthíasson (2010) are however excluded in this thesis as they are 
considered to be purely of a fixed nature (e.g. the operation of child protective services), do 
not support the policy discussion of this thesis (e.g. prevention programs), or are simply too 
uncertain and would therefore add unnecessary fuzziness (e.g. production loss of 
imprisonment). Nonetheless, all the major sources of social cost in Matthíasson (2010) are 
also estimated in section 6. When applicable the most recent information available is used and 
monetary values are all updated to 2015 prices using the consumer price index calculated by 
Statistics Iceland. The newest available price index is for April 2015 prices (427) (Hagstofa 
Íslands, 2015b) while Matthíasson’s (2010) calculations are based on September 2009 prices 
(359). All the estimates in this thesis are presented in April 2015 prices. The majority of 
estimates in Matthíasson is based on information from the yearly budget in Iceland in 2009. 
These expenditures are assumed to be mostly unchanged as the purpose here is to estimate the 
average annual social cost in Iceland in 2015 prices. Amounts from the yearly budget are 
therefore assumed to hold and are simply updated to 2015 prices. Other numbers which are 
assumed to be unchanged from those used by Matthíasson (2010) are average number of 
traffic accidents per year and their severity. Important assumptions of Matthíasson (2010) are 
assumed to hold as well, these are discussed in the text of section 6, and many of the 
assumptions in Table 2 are based on this derivation. In order to reflect the current situation in 
Iceland as well as possible the newest available data is used to isolate the share of illicit drugs 
in Matthíasson’s (2010) results. The 2013 crime statistics of the National Police are used to 
obtain data on traffic violations (where the driver is under the influence of drugs and/or 
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alcohol), and data on the number of recorded criminal offenses by genre 
(Ríkislögreglustjórinn, 2014). Data on patients seeking rehab treatment at Vogur in 2009 is 
used to represent the addicted population in Iceland (SÁÁ, 2010). Other data being used is 
drug use estimates from 2012 (Embætti landlæknis, 2013; Gunnlaugsson, 2013), population 
data from 2015 (Hagstofa Íslands, 2015), and mortality data from 2000-2014 (Hagstofa 
Íslands, 2014). How this data is used in combination with the data and estimation method of 
Matthíasson (2010) is discussed in each relevant part of section 6 where the social cost 
estimates are derived. 
5.1 Main assumptions and their influence 
There are great uncertainties in the cost estimation process. Uncertainties, especially in 
parameters, lead to results with some significant uncertainties (Moore, 2007). Assumptions 
are therefore important in order to account for as much uncertainty as possible. They are 
necessary in order to identify the social costs involved and to obtain the resulting estimates. 
Better assumptions give more reliable results. However, assumptions and other 
simplifications are deterministic for the estimates. That is, different assumptions give 
different estimates and can be very influential when it comes to sensitivity of results. 
Therefore, Table 2 gives an overview of the most important assumptions that have to be made 
and their possible consequences for the estimates of private and external cost of drug 
consumption in Iceland. Each assumption is discussed further in the relevant subchapters of 
section 6. 
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Table 2. Main assumptions and their consequences. 
Assumption Plausible effect 
Amounts from the yearly budget are assumed to be 
unchanged since 2009 (updated w.r.t. price) 
Ambiguous or underestimation due to 
some cuts in public expenditure 
Statistical value of life is based on production loss, i.e. 
estimated according to human capital methods, and 
assumed to be 96,16 million ISK per life lost due to illicit 
drug abuse (direct or indirect link) 
Underestimation, e.g. willingness to 
pay methods have generally indicated 
a much higher value of life 
Statistical value of life is based on 3,3% unemployment 
and 9% disability 
Overestimation due to higher 
unemployment rate in recent years 
Share of illicit drug abuse in fatal traffic accidents is 
assumed to be 24% 
Overestimation due to legal drugs 
Share of illicit drug abuse in severe and minor traffic 
accidents is assumed to be 14% 
Overestimation due to legal drugs 
Traffic accidents where the driver is high are assumed to 
be completely caused by the intoxication 
Overestimation due to outside causes 
and overlap in police records 
Direct violations of drug laws assumed to take up 13% of 
total police time 
Ambiguous 
Violations of other laws where the offender is high 
assumed to take up 16% of total police time 
Ambiguous 
Violations of traffic laws where the offender is high is 
assumed to take up 1,3% of total police time 
Ambiguous 
80% of crime directly or indirectly related to illicit drug 
abuse would not have happened anyways 
Overestimation 
Patients at Vogur are assumed to be representative for the 
substance abuse population in Iceland 
Ambiguous 
60% of patients at Vogur are assumed to have problems 
with illicit drug addiction 
Overestimation due to legal drugs 
The private out-of-pocket share of health care expenditure 
is assumed to be 20% 
Underestimation due to different steps 
in the private share 
19% of illicit drug abusers are hospitalized each year 
compared to 9,75% of Icelanders in general (9,25% are 
excess hospitalization due to illicit drug abuse) 
Ambiguous 
1% of the Icelandic population is assumed to have serious 
problems with illicit drug abuse, i.e. addiction 
Ambiguous 
Detoxification and mental health admissions excluded 
from health care cost 
Underestimation 
11,7% of Emergency Unit visits assumed to be directly or 
indirectly connected to illicit drug abuse 
Ambiguous 
0,89% of annual mortalities are assumed to be directly or 
indirectly associated with illicit drug abuse 
Ambiguous, perhaps overestimation 
Negative causal relationship between drug abuse and 
labour market outcomes is assumed, disability and 
unemployment are still excluded from the main estimates 
Underestimation if the negative 
relationship holds 
Important costs unquantifiable therefore excluded Underestimation 
Supply reduction is assumed to reduce the social cost Ambiguous 
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It is important to note that some addicts are active tax payers and not only at the receiving end 
of social welfare. This should be accounted for when estimating the social external cost of 
illicit drug abuse. Ideally, to find the external cost or the actual burden borne by third parties 
the net effect has to be estimated (Røgeberg, 2007). That is, the contribution of the illicit drug 
abusers in paying for the social expenditure they receive through the health system or the cost 
they cause in the justice system has to be subtracted from these expenditures. Disregarding 
this will overestimate the external cost of illicit drug abuse relative to the private cost. 
Furthermore, the private cost of illicit drug abuse might be exaggerated due to the value of 
drug consumption. That is, the illicit drug users put some value on their use which should 
outweigh some proportion of the private cost. The extent of this valuation is out of the scope 
of this thesis, but aspects such as these matter nonetheless.  
5.2 Subdivision of the social cost 
French et al. (1991) outline a conceptual framework for estimating the social cost of drug 
abuse. In this framework social cost is defined as the sum of private cost borne by drug 
abusers and external cost borne by others. It further separates each type of cost into tangible 
(objective) and intangible (subjective) cost. Tangible cost is defined as costs requiring actual 
resources spent by the society. When this type of cost is reduced more resources can be spent 
differently e.g. on consumption or investment. Intangible cost is mainly defined as pain, 
suffering and/or discomfort borne by individuals. Reduction of this type of cost will not leave 
more to spend on other activities, but it will reduce the problem causing the cost 
(Matthíasson, 2010). Even though intangible costs are difficult and sometimes even 
impossible to quantify they still matter a lot. For example relevant external costs in health 
care such as family support and rehabilitation are aimed at reducing this type of cost, i.e. 
problems causing pain or suffering. 
The framework of French et al. (1991) will be used as a guideline in the discussion of the 
Icelandic cost estimates reviewed in this thesis as it will facilitate identification of different 
elements of the total social cost. It should however be noted that this categorization is not 
intended to reflect upon the policy discussion in this thesis, it is only supposed to help 
categorizing the different aspects of social cost while discussing different cost elements. 
31 
 
The private tangible costs French et al. (1991) deem important to estimate the social cost of 
drug abuse include for example out-of-pocket medical costs, property damage and 
incarceration. In their framework external tangible costs are for example the medical cost, 
crime cost and workplace cost borne by the others in the population. Table 3 gives an 
overview of the tangible social cost and its cost elements, both borne by the drug users and 
others in society.  
Table 3. Tangible social cost elements related to illicit drug abuse. 
Private Tangible Costs External Tangible Costs 
- Out-of-pocket medical-related costs 
 Hospitization, outpatient, and home 
Care 
 Treatment, rehabilitation, and 
therapy 
 Counselling, retraining, and re-
education 
 Services of health professionals 
 Drugs and drug sundries 
 Household help 
 Special equipment for rehabilitation 
 Transportation to health care 
providers 
- Reduced earnings 
- Incarceration 
- Property damage due to accidents 
- Averting behaviour costs 
- Non-private medical-related costs 
 Hospitization, outpatient, and home 
Care 
 Treatment, rehabilitation, and therapy 
 Counselling, retraining, and re-
education 
 Services of health professionals 
 Drugs and drug sundries 
 Household help 
 Special equipment for rehabilitation 
 Transportation to health care 
providers 
- Crime-related costs 
 Prosecution and courts 
 Corrections 
 Crime careers 
 Property loss 
 Victim losses 
- Property damage and injuries due to accidents 
- Reduced property values 
- Workplace costs 
 Productivity loss 
 Workplace accidents 
 Absenteeism 
 Thefts 
 Employee assistance programs 
 Drug testing 
- Reduced leisure time 
- Averting behaviour costs 
 Law enforcement 
 Educational and public service efforts 
 Business and residential security 
systems 
 Community watch programs 
 Business and residential relocations 
 Insurance  
1 The cost elements estimated or discussed in this thesis are in bold 
Source: French et al., 1991.  
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According to French et al. (1991) intangible private costs are primarily characterized by 
physical and mental problems such as physical disability, depression, isolation, and anxiety. 
External intangible cost is also identified to be primarily emotional such as trauma, fear and 
depression. Table 4 gives an overview of the intangible social cost elements incurred by drug 
user, but borne both by them and the others in the population.  
Table 4. Intangible social cost elements related to illicit drug abuse. 
Private Intangible costs External Intangible costs 
 
- Physical disability 
- Reduced self-esteem 
- Anxiety 
- Isolation 
- Resentment 
- Family disruptions and conflicts 
 Divorce 
 Marital violence 
 Child abuse 
- Depression 
- Emotional distress 
 
- Family Disruptions and conflicts 
 Separation 
 Divorce 
 Marital violence 
 Child abuse 
- Physical Disability 
- Fear for personal safety 
- Fear of property loss 
- Loss of friendship 
- Depression 
- Fatigue 
- Emotional distress 
- Cost to children of drug abusers 
 Drug addiction 
 School problems 
 Emotional disturbances 
 Physical health problems 
  
1 The cost elements (briefly) discussed in this thesis are in bold 
Source: French et al., 1991.  
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6 Social cost of drug abuse in Iceland 
In this section the social cost associated with illicit drug abuse is estimated. As previously 
mentioned, this estimation is based on isolating the social cost of illicit drug abuse from 
Matthíasson’s (2010) estimates. This enables estimating some of the most relevant social cost 
for supporting the policy discussion of this thesis. Each step is described in the following 
subsections. 
6.1 Traffic accidents 
Traffic accidents are one of the sources of social cost generated by drug abuse (Collins and 
Lapsley, 2002; Moore, 2007). According to the framework of French et al. (1991) traffic 
accident cost can both be categorized as private and external cost because of the property 
damage and injuries accidents can lead to, as well as the services required to deal with the 
consequences of those accidents. Mortalities are an important factor here. In order to properly 
estimate the social cost of traffic accidents it is important to have some measure for the 
statistical value of lives lost. Matthíasson’s (2010) estimate is based on production loss for the 
society (human capital method). Premature mortalities are very costly for society as the loss 
of people in working age creates production loss in current and future periods. Therefore, the 
value of the lost production has to be discounted. Matthíasson (2010) does so based on data 
on total income per person (value of production), unemployment rate, employment 
participation rate, disability rate, Icelandic life expectancy, and the average age of those who 
die each year directly or indirectly linked to substance abuse. He finds the average number of 
years left of production based on Icelandic retirement age and with that he derives the average 
production loss or statistical value of a life, discounted with a 3% discount factor. Matthíasson 
(2010) uses 3,3% unemployment rate (average unemployment rate in Iceland 1991-2008) and 
9% disability rate. The average unemployment rate in Iceland has been higher in recent years, 
but is slowly lowering again. This will lead to an overestimation of the statistical value of life. 
Given his assumptions Matthíasson (2010) estimates a statistical value of life equal to 80,85 
million ISK per life (September 2009 prices) or 96,16 million ISK in April 2015 prices. As 
noted by Matthíasson (2010) this does not fully estimate the worth of the lives lost due to 
intangible factors and higher value of extra life years, i.e. willingness-to-pay methods have 
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presented much higher values per life. This underestimation will balance out some of the 
overestimation in Matthíasson’s (2010) estimates.  
As explained above the social cost estimates are based on a statistical value of life equal to 
96,16 million ISK. Matthíasson (2010) estimates social cost due to traffic accidents based on 
injury cost (or harm to people), cost of services and property damage. Furthermore, he divides 
cost into two subcategories, i.e. cost borne by those directly involved in the accident and cost 
borne by third parties. This is approximately the private and external cost of traffic accidents, 
but not exactly as explained in section 6.1.1. Matthíasson (2010) mentions police and fire 
department expenditures, medical and ambulance services, and foregone production as 
examples for the traffic accident cost borne by third parties. Personal injury cost is mainly 
defined as physical harm based on the statistical value of life and/or subjective injuries. The 
subjective injuries can both be for the individual involved in the accident and their family, but 
these costs are mostly intangible and are therefore not included in the estimates of 
Matthíasson (2010).  
Matthíasson (2010) uses the statistical value of life in order to estimate the average harm 
caused to society and individuals as a result of a traffic accident. Next he predicts the number 
of injured by severity of accidents from accident registry data. In order to adjust the estimates 
of Matthíasson (2010) to support the discussion of this thesis accident costs are converted to 
current prices by using the consumer price index for April 2015. Table 5 gives the estimated 
the social cost of accidents including injury caused by differently severe traffic accidents. 
These estimates refer to costs defined by harm to people and other incidental expenses, all the 
numbers are in million ISK.  
Table 5. Social cost generated by different severity of traffic accidents that include injury (million ISK). 
Type of 
accident 
Borne by third parties Borne by directly 
involved 
Social cost 
Fatal accident 125,758 17,765 143,523 
Severe accident 56,255 45,248 101,502 
Minor accident 7,854 8,591 16,445 
Source: Matthíasson, 2010. 
Matthíasson (2010) considers the social traffic cost of intoxication, i.e. alcohol and drug use 
of legal and illegal drugs. By using data from the Road Accident Investigation Group he 
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estimates that 48% of all fatal traffic accidents and 28% of other traffic accidents (in the 
period 1998-2008) were caused by intoxication. Matthíasson (2010) derives the share of 
intoxication in fatal accidents based on the average share of fatal accidents where tests 
showed that the driver had been under the influence. This might still be an overestimation as 
explained later in this subsection, but it might be balanced out in part because some accident 
reports do not specify if the driver was intoxicated out of consideration for the family 
members of the deceased (Matthíasson, 2010). The rates estimated by Matthíasson (2010) are 
assumed to hold now as well. In this thesis the focus is on illicit drug consumption, therefore 
these rates have to be split further. Accidents where the driver is intoxicated are very likely to 
end up in police records as well. The relative share of illicit drugs in driving offenses is 
therefore assumed to represent this division. According to the 2013 crime statistics of the 
Icelandic National Police there were 1295 cases recorded where the driver was under the 
influence of alcohol and 1317 cases of drivers under the influence of drugs. That is, in 
50,42% of driver intoxications recorded by the police the driver was on drugs. However, these 
numbers do not account for overlap, i.e. the situations where the driver was intoxicated by 
both types of substance. Moreover, where such an overlap is present the accident was a lot 
more likely to be caused by the alcohol than the drug use because alcohol use increases traffic 
accident risk relatively more (Babor, Caetano et al., 2010). Therefore, if about half of the 
drivers are intoxicated by alcohol they would probably cause more than half of the traffic 
accidents. Therefore, the rate of 50,42% is probably an overestimation of the share of illicit 
drug use in accidents where the driver is intoxicated. However, it is assumed to hold in order 
to facilitate the estimation. The sensitivity of the estimates with regard to this assumption will 
be discussed in section 7.1. Additional overestimation following this rate is that it also 
includes the use of legal drugs, the police records do not make that distinction. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to know precisely to what extent these accidents are due to drug 
use and to what extent they are due to outside forces, i.e. whether they are only due to drug 
use or not. The accidents could easily have happened anyway and/or be caused by other 
factors as well. This is another source of overestimation for the total social cost of traffic 
accidents caused by illicit drug consumption. That is, assuming that the social cost estimates 
are caused by the drug use and excluding outside causes from the analysis will overestimate 
the private and external costs in consideration. However, given the assumptions discussed 
above the total share of drugs in fatal accidents is estimated to be 24%, and 14% for severe 
and minor accidents. Based on this the social cost estimates of Matthíasson (2010) are 
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adjusted with respect to drug use only. The social cost estimates for accidents where people 
are injured are given in Table 6, in the table traffic accidents are categorized by severity. 
Given a statistical value of a life equal to 96,16 million ISK and the assumptions discussed 
above the total accident cost, in accidents including an injury, caused by illicit drug use is 
4.497 million ISK on average each year (2015 prices).  
Table 6. Social cost of traffic accidents that include injuries and are caused by drug use (million ISK). 
Type of 
accident 
Number of 
accidents 
Borne by third 
parties 
Borne by directly 
involved 
Social cost 
Fatal accident 17,75 540 76 617 
Severe accident 141,25 1.122 902 2.024 
Minor accident 799,5 886 970 1.856 
Total 958,5 2.549 1.948 4.497 
1 Given a 24% share in fatalities and 14% in other accidents as explained in text 
2 These estimates are overestimated due to causal uncertainties and legal drugs as explained in text 
Source: Matthíasson, 2010; Ríkislögreglustjórinn, 2014. 
Matthíasson (2010) further estimates a 1,789 million ISK property damage per accident 
resulting from traffic accidents which do not include injuries. These estimates are based on 
data from insurance companies and the Social Insurance Administration in Iceland, and 
adjusted for underreporting of personal property damage. Given an annual number of 5.632 
traffic accidents, with and without injury, the total property damage cost is 10.075 million 
ISK (2015 prices). The share of accidents caused by drivers under the influence is assumed to 
be the same as for severe and minor accidents, i.e. 14%. This gives a total property damage of 
1.422 million ISK. These results are summarized in Table 7. Combined the results of Table 6 
and Table 7 give a total traffic-related social cost of 5.919 million ISK, including negative 
effects on people (life or health lost), objects (damage to cars), and cost for third parties. 
Table 7. Cost of property damage in traffic accidents caused by drug use (million ISK). 
Property damage pr. 
accident 
Number of accidents (incl. 
accidents without injury) 
Total property damage (pr. 
year) 
1,789 5.632 1.422 
1 Given a 14% share in accidents 
Source: Matthíasson, 2010.  
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6.1.1 Private and external part of traffic accident cost 
As mentioned before, Matthíasson’s (2010) division of cost between third parties and private 
individuals is not precisely a division between private and external cost. A part of the personal 
cost in Matthíasson’s (2010) estimates is external cost according to the definition of this 
thesis. That is, some directly involved in the traffic accident are affected by negative 
externalities of the drug user’s decision to drive under the influence. If half of the personal 
cost and half of property damage can be accounted as private cost and half as external cost the 
social cost could be separated. That is, with a total traffic accident social cost of 5.919 million 
ISK the private cost would amount to 1.685 million ISK and external cost to 4.234 million. 
As previously mentioned, it is important to keep in mind the uncertainties about how many of 
these accidents are actually caused by the drug abuse and not some other factors.  
6.2 Law enforcement, courts and punishment 
A considerable fraction of costs of law enforcement, criminal courts and prisons is due to 
illicit drugs and drug use (Collins and Lapsley, 2002), i.e. can be identified as social costs of 
drugs. Moore (2007), and Collins and Lapsley (2002) use self-reported criminal activity to 
reflect the proportion of these costs attributable to drug use. Matthíasson (2010) uses time 
logs of police work analysed by type of offense and sector; prosecution, crime and 
punishment; budget expenditure categorized by sector of law enforcement; studies on alcohol 
and drug consumption of prisoners; studies on the criminal behaviour of those who got treated 
at Vogur in 2008; and crime statistics from the National Commissioner of Police. To avoid 
double-counting Matthíasson (2010) does not account for law enforcement cost due to driving 
under the influence. Where appropriate he accounts for this type of cost, i.e. if the offense 
comes to criminal court or punishment.  
There is a clear association between illicit drugs and criminal activity. That is, majority of 
arrestees have recently used drugs and most have used illicit drugs sometime in their life 
(Schulte, Mouzos and Makkai, 2005; Matthíasson, 2010; Moore, 2007). In Goldstein (1985) 
drugs are causally associated with crime in three different ways. That is crime due to the 
intoxication of the user, crime due to financing drug use, and systematic crime due to 
operation of drug markets and drug distribution (Goldstein, 1985; Moore, 2007). Most crimes 
committed in Iceland are non-violent with a financial motive and committed randomly 
(Gunnlaugsson, 2000), but recently systematic crime has been surfacing. With respect to 
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variety in criminal activity, different drugs have different impact. For example, cannabis has 
been causally connected to income-generating crime but not to violence (Pacula and Kilmer, 
2003). Even though the association between drugs and crime is no contradiction it is difficult 
to pinpoint exactly the crime-related social cost of drug consumption. This is due to 
uncertainties about causality as well as intangibility (MacCoun, Kilmer and Reuter, 2003; 
Moore, 2007; Speckart and Anglin, 1986). That is, as discussed in section 2.2, drug abuse is 
most often connected to other severe social problems which might be the true cause of the 
criminal behaviour instead of the drug abuse. These social problems could for example be 
weak or marginal social position, lack of education and skill, violent family background, and 
mental health problems. Individuals in this group are generally more likely to participate in 
criminal activity, even in the absence of drug abuse.  
Law enforcement 
To estimate the social cost of alcohol and drug consumption incurred due to police 
intervention Matthíasson (2010) analyses police time logs by type of offenses and divides 
them into three differently weighted categories based on type of crime. He then estimates the 
average time the police spends on each category. That is,  
1. Violations of drug and alcohol law weighted 100% in Matthíasson’s (2010) estimates 
which results in these crimes occupying about 17% of total time spent on police work. 
In order to isolate the share of illicit drugs from the share of alcohol crime statistics 
from 2013 are used to estimate the relative share of each type of offense. According to 
Ríkislögreglustjórinn (2014) the number of offenses connected to drug law violation 
was 2.183 while the same for alcohol law was 710. This gives illicit drugs a 75,46% 
share of the total time cost connected to both alcohol and drugs. That is, 75,46% of the 
17% estimated by Matthíasson (2010), or approximately 13% of police time. 
2. Income generating crime, theft, domestic disturbance, assault, violation of privacy, 
sexual offense and other type of violent crime weighted 70% because approximately 
70% of prisoners have problems with alcohol and/or drug addiction. This results in 
these crimes occupying about 27% of police time according to the calculations of 
Matthíasson (2010). These crimes are more indirectly linked to drugs, i.e. they are 
very often caused by drugs but do not violate drug laws. In order to isolate the share of 
illicit drugs it is assumed that these criminals have the same addiction distribution as 
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patients at Vogur (treatment institution), i.e. that 60% of those suffering from 
addiction are dependent on illicit drugs as discussed in section 2.1. This share is 
overestimated due to the contribution of legal drugs, the effect of this assumption will 
be tested in section 7.1 on sensitivity. For income generating crime and theft drug 
abuse is a more frequent source of crime, but for domestic disturbance, assault, sexual 
offenses and violence alcohol is known to have more negative effects than the illicit 
drug types most common in Iceland. In any case, 60% of the 27% estimated by 
Matthíasson (2010) are attributed to illicit drugs, or approximately 16% of police time.  
3. Other traffic offenses weighted 28% as in the traffic cost estimates of Matthíasson 
(2010) which resulted in a 2,6% share of police time. However, as in Matthíasson 
(2010), these offenses weight 0% in the cost calculation to prevent double-counting. 
They are already included in the estimates of section 6.1. 
Hence, the Icelandic police spends 29% of its time on drug-related crime. Whether the crime 
is the cause or effect of illicit drug use does not change this percentage. However, in order to 
obtain the estimates something has to be assumed about the proportion of drug-related crime 
that would not occur in the absence of drug use. That is, some of the offenders would be 
criminals anyways for example because of other social problems or simply character. In order 
to account for this Matthíasson (2010) puts a lower limit on his estimates that assumes that 
80% of the offenders who commit drug-related crime do so only because of their addiction. 
Matthíasson (2010) bases this limit on a study of the National Institute on Drug abuse which 
shows that criminal activity of former prisoners reduces significantly once they get rehab 
(NIDA, 2009). His upper limit is 100% which is very unrealistic, especially given this 
section’s discussion on uncertainties and the Icelandic context where cannabis is the most 
common drug. Studies have for example shown that criminal behaviour of cannabis-
dependent individuals is not explained by their substance abuse, but by their juvenile history 
of delinquent behaviour (NZPA, 2001). Therefore, assuming that 80% of crime linked to drug 
abuse is caused by the drug abuse and would not have happened anyways is surely an 
overestimation. Nonetheless, the 80% limit of Matthíasson (2010) is used for the purpose of 
this thesis, how this assumption effects the sensitivity of the social cost estimates is tested 
further in section 7.1. In any case, using the 80% limit of Matthíasson (2010), approximately 
23,2% of police time is spent on drug-related crime. 
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In order to estimate the drug-related cost of law enforcement Matthíasson (2010) analyses 
data from several District Commissioners’ offices in Iceland. He concludes that 58% of 
operating expenses go directly to law enforcement along with additional 4,2% through 
administration expenses. Based on the share of police time due to intoxication he estimates 
the share of district operations which is connected to intoxication. The same method is used in 
this thesis which gives a 17,7% share. In order to estimate the share of the Public Prosecutor 
Matthíasson (2010) used data on alcohol and drug addiction of prisoners from 2008 and data 
on the reason for imprisonment from 2000-2008. He estimated a lower limit of 54%, as before 
the lower limit is considered more realistic. In order to isolate the share of illicit drugs it 
would be possible to use the percentage calculated from the crime statistics (75,46%) or from 
those treated at Vogur (60%). The former would probably overestimate the share of illicit 
drugs while the latter would probably underestimate it. Hence, the average of the two is used 
here. 
With the information discussed in this subsection the total social cost of law enforcement 
generated in each sector can be estimated. Table 8 gives the resulting estimates in 2015 
prices. The total social cost of law enforcement (excluding traffic offense) is approximately 
2.495 million ISK.  
Table 8. Drug-related social cost of law enforcement (million ISK). 
Law 
enforcement 
sector 
Yearly budget 
dedicated to each 
Share of illicit drugs Social cost by sector 
National Police 6.809,5 0,232 1.581 
District 
Commissioners 
4.869,6 0,177 860 
Public 
Prosecutor 
144,4 0,368 53 
Total   2.495 
1 Given a 13% share of policy time spent on illicit drug offenses (explained in text) 
2  Given a 16% share of policy time spent on  other offenses excl. traffic offenses (explained in text) 
3 Assumed that 80% of drug-related crime is due to drug use (likely overestimated) 
Source: Matthíasson, 2010; Ríkislögreglustjórinn, 2014; SÁÁ, 2010. 
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Criminal courts 
In Matthíasson (2010) the share of alcohol and drug use in courts and lawsuits is assumed to 
be the same as the share in police time, i.e. 35,2% lower limit and 44% upper limit. That is, 
23,2% and 29% in this thesis where drugs are isolated. These shares are also given to the cost 
of official cases in criminal court, public law assistance and victim compensation. Looking at 
the total number of court cases in 2008 Matthíasson (2010) finds that 17% of District Court 
cases and 44% of Supreme Court cases are relevant criminal cases. He assumes the share of 
alcohol and drugs in these cases to be the same as their share in law enforcement (i.e. 23,2% 
and 29% in this thesis). As before the upper limit (100% of drug-related crime only caused by 
the drug abuse) is considered excessive so the lower limit is used and the judicial social cost 
of illicit drug consumption is estimated. The resulting shares and the corresponding judicial 
social costs are shown in Table 9. According to these estimates illicit drug use generates 
approximately 256 million ISK in judicial social cost per year (2015 prices).  
Table 9. Judicial social cost due to illicit drugs (million ISK). 
Type of 
judicial cost 
Yearly budget Share of illicit drugs Social cost 
Supreme Court 135 0,102 14 
District Court 1.274 0,039 50 
Official lawsuit 
cost 
489 0,232 114 
Public law 
assistance 
256 0,232 59 
Victim 
compensation 
83 0,232 19 
Total   256 
1 Given the same share as the time share of the police, i.e. 23,2% 
2 44% of Supreme Court cases relevant criminal cases (thereof 23,2% drug-related) 
3 17% of District Court cases relevant criminal cases (thereof 23,2% drug-related) 
Source: Matthíasson, 2010. 
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Punishment 
The drug-related social cost of punishment is twofold. First is the cost of the actual 
imprisonment, i.e. operating expenditures of correctional facilities, and second is the social 
cost of production loss due to imprisonment (Matthíasson, 2010). The latter is more of an 
indirect consequence of drug use and will not be included in this thesis as it is prone to too 
many uncertainties. That is, prisons in Iceland have an active production of various goods and 
those would outweigh a part of the social cost generated by production loss. In order to know 
whether the net effect is positive or negative unavailable information is needed, and it would 
add too much fuzziness to make assumptions about this. Therefore, the production loss due to 
imprisonment will not be included in the estimates, but the share of illicit drugs in the social 
cost of punishment will be estimated. As previously mentioned Matthíasson (2010) used data 
on cause of imprisonment and addiction of prisoners to get a lower limit of 54% for the share 
of alcohol and drug use in the social cost of punishment. Previously in this section this 
estimate was adjusted to 36,8% for the isolated share of illicit drug consumption. Based on 
this share and the yearly budget on prison institutions (1.203,5 million ISK) the estimated 
social cost of punishment is 443 million ISK (2015 prices). These results are summarized in 
Table 10. 
Table 10. Drug-related social cost of punishment (million ISK). 
Yearly budget on 
correctional facilities 
Share of illicit drugs (Direct) social cost of 
punishment 
1.203,5 0,368 443 
Source: Matthíasson, 2010. 
6.2.1 Private and external part of legal and crime cost 
Important private costs connected to this section is the income loss of prisoners, but this 
cannot be estimated based on the same arguments as their production loss will not be included 
in the social cost estimates (discussed above). Additionally, being registered as a criminal will 
make it even harder for prisoners to develop professionally once they are free again. This is an 
important private cost element excluded from the discussion of this thesis. The social cost 
discussed in the section above is mainly external, i.e. it is borne by other members of society. 
However, some part of this is of course private cost too as some illicit drug abusers are active 
tax payers and contribute to the public funds financing the justice system. Given a 37,30% 
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income tax level (the tax rate for the lowest of three income steps in Iceland) the private part 
of the cost estimated in this section would be 165 million ISK and the external part would be 
278 million ISK. These approximations can be misleading as illicit drug abusers are generally 
more likely to be unemployed or disable than others in society. Given the assumptions of 
Matthíasson (2010) the average disability rate among addicts is 22,2% and the average 
unemployment rate 5,43% which is surely underestimated according to Gunnlaugsson’s 
(2013) results. These assumptions would translate into 122 million in private cost and 322 
million ISK in external cost. According to the assessment of Gunnlaugsson (2013) about 
unemployment among addicted criminals the private cost would only be about half of what 
Matthíasson’s (2010) assumptions indicate. The division between private and external cost is 
clearly sensitive to these assumptions. Therefore, the social cost of law enforcement, courts 
and punishment will not be subdivided further in the main estimates. As the external cost is 
the larger part in this cost category all the social cost will be counted as external cost at the 
expense of underestimating the private cost. In any case the social cost is what matters for the 
discussion of this thesis.  
The crime-related external costs discussed in this section are in large part generated by how 
society and authorities respond to crime, i.e. the control regime. This point will be discussed 
further in section 8.1.3. However, an important part of these external costs is in fact derived 
harm of drug abuse. That is, the share of illicit drug use in criminal activity not directly 
connected to drugs which is all criminal activity except for the actual drug law offenses. This 
includes for example property damage, price of protection, emotional and physical trauma to 
the victims of crime, homicide, undesired behavioural safeguards (Collins and Lapsley, 2002; 
Moore, 2007), and various other external costs induced by drug-related crime. Even though 
some of these external costs are quite tangible it is still difficult to identify how much is 
actually resulting from drug-related crime. These costs will not be estimated in this thesis due 
to the many uncertainties, but they matter nonetheless which leads to an underestimation of 
the external costs in this category. 
6.3 Health 
It is known that illicit drug consumption is related to miscellaneous physical and mental 
health problems that can be long term and complicated to deal with. This translates into 
multiple visits to different health facilities. Ridolfo and Stevenson (2001), for example, 
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identified 26 drug-related health conditions, either completely or partly caused by illicit drug 
consumption. Matthíasson (2010) analysed addiction severity interviews from Vogur in order 
to evaluate how much more health care is needed by those who abuse alcohol or drugs 
compared to society in general. That is, the excess health care cost due to addiction. 
Furthermore, he used data from the National University Hospital of Iceland to estimate 
frequency and cost of hospitalization, and consequently the average cost of admissions. Each 
year approximately 19% of the patients at Vogur had been admitted to a hospital while only 
9,75% of people in general had been admitted. These rates exclude hospitalization due to 
detoxification, mental disorders, pregnancy or birth (Matthíasson, 2010). In any case the 
frequency of hospitalization is much higher for alcohol and drug addicts than for the average 
Icelandic person. The average rate of excess hospitalization among addicts is therefore the 
difference between the two, i.e. 9,25%. This excess rate is the source of social cost connected 
to health care. Matthíasson (2010) estimated the number of alcohol and drug abusers based on 
a study by the Health Directorate in Iceland and population numbers from Statistics Iceland. 
With this information he estimates the excess hospital admission for this group. This method 
will be used in this section to isolate the excess health care cost of illicit drug abusers. That is, 
according to Icelandic research 1% of the population has addiction problems regarding illicit 
drug use (Embætti landlæknis, 2013; Gunnlaugsson, 2013; Matthíasson, 2010).  
In the beginning of 2015 the population of Iceland was 329.100 (Hagstofa Íslands, 2015a). 
Given that 1% have illicit drug problems the number of Icelanders with drug problems should 
amount to 3.291 people. Given a 9,25% excess hospitalization (excluding detoxification, 
mental disorders, pregnancy and birth) the excess admissions of this group are estimated to be 
304 per year. Matthíasson (2010) uses data from the National University Hospital and 
estimates an average cost per admission of 857.568 ISK (in 2015 prices). This translates into 
approximately 261 million ISK in social cost of drug-related health care. When looking at the 
cost generated in the Emergency Unit Matthíasson (2010) estimates an average cost of 40.440 
ISK per visit and 94.650 visits per year. The share of visitors under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs is 51%. However, it is not uncommon that people who do not have addiction problems 
somehow manage to end up in the Emergency Unit, especially after a night of partying. 
Therefore, when isolating the share of illicit drugs, alcohol is presumed to be the main cause 
of these visits, i.e. generate the bulk of the social cost identified by Matthíasson (2010). 
Therefore, only the 23% share of harder drug addiction among rehab patients at Vogur (SÁÁ, 
2010) is assumed to reflect the share of illicit drugs in Emergency room visits, i.e. 23% of the 
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visits by intoxicated people or 11,7% of total visits. This results in a social cost estimate of 
449 million ISK (2015 prices). The results for excess health care cost due to illicit drug use, 
i.e. the health care social cost of drug use, are summarized in Table 11. 
Table 11. Social cost of health care due to illicit drug use (million ISK). 
Place of care Excess visits pr. year Average cost pr. visit Social cost of health 
care 
National University 
Hospital 
304 0,858 261 
Emergency Unit 11.102 0,04 449 
Total   710 
1 Given a 9,25% excess hospitalization by addicts (explained in text) 
2 Given a 11,7% share in visits to the Emergency Unit (explained in text) 
3 Underestimation due to exclusion of detoxification and psychiatric admissions 
4 Underestimation due to exclusion of other health care units 
Source: Matthíasson, 2010; SÁÁ, 2010. 
Additional social cost related to health services is the cost of rehab treatment. According to 
Statistics Iceland the average societal expenditure in this category for 2008-2010 was about 
930 million ISK (2015 prices) (Hagstofa Íslands, 2011). To estimate the share of illicit drugs 
in this category they are, as before, given the same share as the percentage of patients at 
Vogur dealing with drug addiction. This will however slightly overestimate the social cost as 
legal drugs are a part of this proportion.  
Table 12. Social spending on rehabilitation treatment (million ISK). 
Spending Share of illicit drugs Social cost of treatment 
1.106 0,6 664 
1 Slightly overestimated due to legal drugs 
Source: Hagstofa Íslands, 2011; SÁÁ, 2010. 
6.3.1 Private and external part of health-related cost 
Where social services and hospitals are mainly publicly funded, as in Iceland, the external 
cost reflected in increased public expenditure can be substantial. The social cost of health care 
estimated above is by definition mostly external. The drug abuser does neither bear it nor 
account for it in decision making. Even though social services and hospitals are mainly 
publicly funded there are always some out-of-pocket medical expenses borne by the addict. 
The private expenses are the lesser part of medical-related social costs, but they still count and 
even though the private proportion of the cost generated by these visits is not high it 
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accumulates. Illicit drug abusers, for example, have to pay a higher proportion of their health 
care costs than Icelanders on average (Matthíasson, 2010). In 2012 the individual share of 
total health expenditure was around 20%. The external part was estimated above, i.e. 710 
million ISK, which would give a private cost of 178 million ISK. This is most likely 
underestimated because of the same reasons the external cost is so, and because addicts 
generally have to bear a greater share of their medical cost than the average. Furthermore, 
some addicts contribute through tax payments which leads to an underestimation of the 
private share of social health care cost. Given a 37,3% income tax rate, 5,43% unemployment 
rate among addicts (surely underestimated, see e.g. Gunnlaugsson, 2013), and 22,2% 
disability rate among addicts 195 million ISK would be subtracted from the external cost and 
added to the private cost. However, for the same reasons as discussed in section 6.2.1, the 
social cost of health care in the main estimates will not be subdivided any further than has 
already been done (results in Table 13). This does not change the total social cost estimate, 
but some of the cost that should really be defined as private cost has been transferred to the 
external cost estimate so the external cost is overestimated at the expense of the private cost. 
Table 13. Private and external health care cost (million ISK). 
Private cost External cost Social cost of health care 
178 710,0 888 
1 Given a 20% private share in total health care cost 
2 Social cost underestimated, external cost overestimated relative to private cost (both explained in text) 
 
As noted by Moore (2007) only including these tangible health costs gives a limited 
impression of the actual private cost borne by drug users, the loss of health is even more 
important. He therefore focuses on drug-years lost due to disability and potential years lost 
due to premature death while estimating the health related social costs induced by drug abuse.  
An important source of intangible external cost is the impact on families of addicts. Even 
though it cannot be estimated here it is important to bear in mind. The external costs 
generated by individual drug consumption but borne by the family of addicts are 
miscellaneous. The negative psychological impact close relatives often have to live with as a 
result of loved one’s drug abuse is of great importance in this respect. This impact can for 
example be in the form of the anger, sorrow, shock, stress, trauma, low self-esteem, distress, 
anxiety, desperation, guilt, depression, self-blame, insecurity, feelings of responsibility and 
failure close relatives suffer from. These negative psychological impact and severe stress-
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related problems undoubtedly lower the quality of life for close family members of the addict. 
As strain on close relatives grows, it becomes more likely that they themselves suffer from 
some sort of psychological harm as a consequence. Furthermore, the constant stress can 
likewise lead to stress-related physical disease such as stomach and bowel problems, muscle 
aches and fatigue (SÁÁ, n.d.). Even though close relatives react differently and the extent of 
how they are effected is different, it can be argued that the impact is never positive.  
6.3.2 Mortality 
Illicit drug use is directly associated with morbidity and mortality, for example through 
overdose, other injury, non-communicable physical disease, mental disorders, and infectious 
disease. In this sense drug use by injection is especially risky (Babor, Caulkins et al., 2010; 
Babor, Room et al., 2010). Illicit drug use is indirectly associated with morbidity and 
mortality through externalities, e.g. traffic accidents and homicide. Matthíasson (2010) 
estimates that 83 deaths are directly or indirectly connected to alcohol or drug abuse in the 
year 2008. As the statistical value of a life is assumed to be 96,16 million this amounts to a 
social loss of 7.982 million ISK (2015 prices), this is the human capital or production loss for 
society (Matthíasson, 2010). However, it can be questionable to adjust these results with 
respect to illicit drug use. More recent numbers with the same categorization of mortalities are 
unavailable, and causes of death are somewhat fluctuating. In order to approximate this strong 
stability assumptions have to be made. Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind the social 
cost of increased mortality, both when it comes to private and external cost. Of the 83 
mortalities Matthíasson (2010) deemed alcohol and drug related 9 were connected with traffic 
accidents. These are already accounted for in section 6.1 which results in 74 additional deaths 
connected with alcohol and drug consumption. In order to isolate the share of illicit drugs it is 
again assumed that SÁÁ’s (2010) 23% share of harder drug addiction among rehab patients 
reflects the relative share of illicit drugs (as for Emergency visits). This lower bound 
(compared to 60% in other sections) is more intuitive as harder drugs are more harmful both 
for health and violence which could lead to mortality (Babor, Caulkins et al., 2010; Babor, 
Room et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2006; Pacula and Kilmer, 2003; Room, 2006). Therefore 
about 17 mortalities in Iceland are assumed to be, either directly or indirectly, drug-related 
each year (excluding traffic accidents). This is 0,89% of the average deaths per year which 
corresponds to the results of a Canadian research on substance abuse. According to Rehm et 
al. (2006) 0,78% of all deaths are attributed to illicit drug use, directly or indirectly. This 
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result is considered relevant for comparison because Canadian alcohol and drug use along 
with the government’s share in welfare is similar to the Icelandic context (Matthíasson, 2010; 
Rehm et al., 2006). With this information and the estimated statistical value of life the annual 
social cost of mortality connected to illicit drug abuse is approximately 1.637 million ISK 
(2015 prices). This is summarized in Table 14. 
Table 14. Social cost of mortality associated with illicit drug abuse, excl. traffic accidents (million ISK).  
Mortalities Statistical value of life Social cost 
17 96,16 1.637 
1 Given a 0,89% share in all mortalities            
Source: Hagstofa Íslands, 2014; Matthíasson, 2010; SÁÁ, 2010. 
Collins and Lapsley (2002) estimated the health-related social cost of illicit drug 
consumption, including the factors estimated here above and many more. In their estimates 
they accounted for the foregone cost (“savings”) in these areas due to premature deaths 
(Collins and Lapsley, 2002; Moore, 2007). Ideally foregone cost should be estimated as well 
because it matters for pure cost analysis. It can surely seem unethical, but from an economic 
perspective it matters especially when looking at the external cost (Røgeberg, 2007). As 
Røgeberg (2007) points out that substance abusers who die because of their addiction lead to 
production loss for society and a loss of tax income. However, to some extent these deaths 
also include cost “savings” as the deceased no longer need pension nor extra medical 
assistance in the future. It is of course not being argued here that mortality of drug users is 
desirable, this is just a cost effect that needs to be kept in mind. The extent of these “savings” 
is of course related to the scope of the welfare system (Røgeberg, 2007). This argument 
relates both to mortality of addicts and the deaths caused to others by addicts (e.g. traffic 
accident or homicide). This “savings” factor is only partly accounted for in Matthíasson’s 
(2010) statistical value of life. He assumes that each individual’s accumulated tax earnings 
should be sufficient to pay for his pension in retirement, which might be true for mortalities 
where the individual is not an addict but dies because of the actions of an addict. This is much 
less likely to hold for the actual addict which could lead to an overestimation of the statistical 
value of life. However, as mentioned in the beginning of section 6.1, the production loss 
method is already underestimating the value of life so this simplification by Matthíasson 
(2010) should not be pivotal for the result. Therefore, the adjusted estimates based on 
Matthíasson (2010) are considered quite suitable for estimating the social mortality cost.  
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6.4 Disability and employment 
Consumption of illicit drugs can effect drug users’ performance in the labour market, i.e. their 
productivity is reduced, unemployment is higher and they rely more on welfare (Moore, 
2007). Dependent drug users in the labour force are more ineffective than they could have 
been and many of them are out of the labour force because of their addiction. Addicts out of 
the labour force are foregone labour for the economy which also leads to foregone tax revenue 
for society, not to mention increased welfare payments. While loss of productivity decreases 
efficiency it could even reduce economic growth. Matthíasson (2010) estimates the social cost 
as the excess production loss generated by increased disability and unemployment of alcohol 
and drug addicts to be 29.878 million ISK (2015 prices). Given a 60% share of drug users as 
before (based on patients at Vogur) this would translate into 17.927 million ISK excess 
production loss for illicit drug abuse. This estimate will however not be included in the cost 
estimate of this thesis. In the process of obtaining his result Matthíasson (2010) makes some 
very strong assumptions about the development of the unemployment rate and the number of 
people registered as disable. Those suffering from alcohol or drug problems are three times 
more likely to receive disability than Icelanders in general, and employment rate among 
addicts is much lower (Matthíasson, 2010). However, it is difficult to estimate precisely how 
many would not be receiving disability or be employed in the absence of addiction. 
Furthermore, as noted by Moore (2007), researchers have not reached any consensus on the 
causal relationship between illicit drug use and labour market outcomes. Some claim to have 
found a causal link where drug use has negative effects on labour markets (e.g. DeSimone, 
2002; Kaestner, 1994; Van Ours, 2005), while others are inconclusive about the relationship 
(e.g. MacDonald and Pudney, 2001), or even find a positive link (e.g. Gill and Michaels, 
1992; Kaestner, 1991). Based on this Moore (2007) does not include costs related to the 
labour market in his social cost estimates (he however assumes a negative relationship in his 
sensitivity analysis). In the Icelandic context a negative relationship is assumed to be more 
applicable which leads to underestimation of the social cost when this production loss is 
excluded.  
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6.4.1 Private and external part of disability and employment cost 
Another important aspect in this category is the private cost to illicit drug abusers. That is, the 
production loss to society and disability is also the income loss of drug abusers. Therefore, it 
is more relevant to divide this cost into private and external cost. That is, production loss 
minus the tax would be defined as the private cost of illicit drug consumption (the income 
loss), while the tax share of the production loss would be defined as external cost (foregone 
tax revenue). This division is however very unclear because of disability checks and 
unemployment benefits. That is, publicly funded welfare checks reduce the income loss of the 
addicts and increase the public expenditure. Therefore, the private cost should be lower and 
the external cost should be higher. Based on these arguments the social cost of disability and 
unemployment will not be subdivided further in this exercise.  
Additionally, very important private costs in this category are intangible and can therefore not 
be estimated precisely. First and foremost this relates to the private cost of lost quality of life 
as disability and often unemployment cause severe harm to people mental health and other 
factors important for their life-quality. Generally people highly value any extra years avoiding 
disability or unforeseen death due to disability (Abelson, 2003; Moore, 2007).  
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7 Summary of social cost estimates 
According to the Central Bank of Iceland the average exchange rate in April 2015 was 17,26 
ISK for the Norwegian krone and 146,76 ISK for the euro (Seðlabanki Íslands, 2015). That is, 
approximately 0,058 NOK/ISK and 0,007 EUR/ISK. Appendix 1 overviews the summary 
table for the social cost estimates according to these exchange rates, as well as the sensitivity 
tables presented here. 
All the estimated social costs are presented in Table 15. These costs are only estimated with 
respect to the cost elements included and quantified in this thesis. According to these 
estimates the average annual social cost of illicit drug abuse in Iceland is approximately 
12.302 million ISK (2015 prices). The largest factor in this social cost seems to be reflected 
by the social cost of traffic accidents (including the value of lives lost) and law enforcement. 
This is in line with the results of Moore (2007) which claim that crime-related social cost 
(including traffic accidents) generates the greatest burden for society. 
Table 15. Average social cost of illicit drug abuse per year (million ISK). 
Cost category Source of social cost Social cost Total for category 
Traffic accidents Accidents including 
injuries 
4.497  
 Property damage 1.422 5.919 
Law 
enforcement 
National Police 1.581  
 District Commissioners 860  
 Public Prosecutor 53 2.495 
Courts Supreme Court 14  
 District Court 50  
 Official lawsuit cost 114  
 Public law assistance 59  
 Victim compensation 19 256 
Punishment Correctional facilities 443 443 
Health and 
health care 
National University 
Hospital 
326  
 Emergency Unit 561  
 Rehabilitation 664  
 Mortality 1.637 3.188 
Total   12.302 
1 April 2015 prices                                             
2 Given the assumptions in this thesis                   
3 Average exchange rates in April 2015 were 0,058 NOK/ISK and 0,007 EUR/ISK                                         
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Important sources of social cost are clearly missing from the estimates, especially regarding 
private cost. Therefore, the annual social cost is expected to be even higher as important 
intangible costs are excluded from the calculations along with less quantifiable social costs. 
Table 2 in section 5.1 summarizes some of the most important sources of bias in the 
estimates, i.e. causes of over- and underestimation. These are important to keep in mind while 
considering the social cost estimates.  
7.1 Sensitivity and shortcomings 
The estimates obtained in this thesis are merely to support the discussion on policy 
justification and the case of Iceland. It is still very important to keep in mind that results, such 
as these, are certainly sensitive to the assumptions of the analysis.  
One of the stronger assumptions made in this thesis is about the 60% relative share of drug 
abusers based on their share of patients at Vogur (rehab institution) (SÁÁ, 2010). This 
estimate was used to approximate the relative share of drug abusers when looking at people 
who either struggled with drug and/or alcohol addiction. This share is expected to reflect well 
the relative share of illicit drug abusers compared to alcoholics. That is, the individuals 
seeking treatment at Vogur are expected to be representative for the population struggling 
with addiction and substance abuse. However, as mentioned before, this share also includes 
the people struggling with drug addiction mixed with alcohol problems. Using this share 
assumes all the people in this category to have problems with illicit drugs not legal drugs 
which leads to some overestimation. Therefore, for sensitivity purposes, the lower limit of 
40% is assumed to hold, i.e. those struggling with a mix of alcohol and drug problems are 
assumed to be addicted to legal drugs. The results of this modification are summarized in 
Table 16. 
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Table 16. Sensitivity to the relative distribution of illicit drug abusers and alcoholics (million ISK).  
Source of cost Lower limit Upper limit 
Traffic accidents 5.919 5.919 
Law enforcement 2.071 2.495 
Courts 209 256 
Punishment 378 443 
Health care 888 888 
Rehabilitation 442 664 
Mortality 1.637 1.637 
Total social cost 11.543 12.302 
1 April 2015 prices                                             
2 Lower limit based on a 40% share of illicit drug abusers at Vogur, upper limit based on a 60% share 
3 Average exchange rates in April 2015 were 0,058 NOK/ISK and 0,007 EUR/ISK 
 
The share of illicit drug abuse in driving offences most likely overestimates the share of illicit 
drug abuse in traffic accidents as discussed in section 6.1. Overlap of alcohol and drug 
intoxicated drivers, and more risk involving driving under the influence of alcohol are 
important sources of overestimation. That is, assuming that 50,42% of accidents caused by 
intoxication are caused by illicit drug abuse can be misleading. Based on other assumptions, 
discussed in section 6.1, this leads to the assumption that 28% of fatal accidents are caused by 
drug abuse and 14% of other accidents. This can have a great effect on the social cost 
estimates for traffic accidents. Table 17 summarizes the social cost of traffic accidents for 
different shares of illicit drugs in accidents with intoxicated drivers.  
Table 17. Sensitivity to the relative share of illicit drugs in traffic accidents that are caused by driver 
intoxication (million ISK). 
 10% 20% 30% 40% 50,42% 
Total social cost generated by 
traffic accidents 
1.174 2.348 3.522 4.696 5.919 
1 April 2015 prices                                                                         
2 Given the assumptions in this thesis                    
3 50% share gives 20% share in fatal accidents, and 14% share in severe and minor traffic accidents (explained in text)    
4 Average exchange rates in April 2015 were 0,058 NOK/ISK and 0,007 EUR/ISK 
 
Additionally, as discussed in section 6.2, the rate of drug-related crime that is actually 
assumed to be caused by the drug abuse is very influential for the social cost estimates 
associated with the justice system (law enforcement, courts and punishment). In this thesis 
Matthíasson’s (2010) rate of 80% was used to derive the estimates, i.e. it was assumed that 
80% of crimes directly or indirectly linked to drug abuse would not have happened without 
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the drug abuse. This rate is clearly very high and is expected to lead to an overestimation of 
justice system social cost. Therefore, it is important to see how changing this rate affects the 
results. This is summarized in Table 18. 
Table 18. Sensitivity to the share of drug-related crime attributed to drug abuse only (million ISK). 
 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
Total social cost, 
upper limit 
10.059 10.807 11.554 12.302 13.049 
Total social cost, 
lower limit 
9.704 10.317 10.930 11.543 12.157 
1 April 2015 prices                                                                         
2 Given the assumptions in this thesis                    
3 Lower limit based on a 40% share of illicit drug abusers at Vogur, upper limit based on a 60% share 
4 Average exchange rates in April 2015 were 0,058 NOK/ISK and 0,007 EUR/ISK 
 
Another influential sensitivity factor is the statistical value of life. As discussed in section 6.1 
the statistical value of each life used to obtain the estimates is 96,16 million ISK per life lost. 
Matthíasson (2010) derives this value based on premature deaths directly or indirectly 
associated with alcohol and drug abuse, and the average years left living. This value, as noted 
by Matthíasson (2010) is based on production loss to society and is expected to underestimate 
its true value. Willingness to pay methods evaluate a much higher value for each life and the 
results have been used to try to correct for this underestimation, but they tend to overestimate 
the value (Matthíasson, 2010; Moore, 2007). The value of life chosen and the method used to 
estimate it can therefore be very influential for the result, in particular for the social cost of 
mortality. Matthíasson’s (2010) sensitivity analysis is based on five different statistical values 
of life which he adjusts based on foreign results and two Icelandic studies. These different 
values and their implication for mortality cost are summarized in Table 19.  
Table 19. Sensitivity to different life values (million ISK). 
 96,16 174,37 348,74 454,59 523,10 
Social cost of 
mortality 
1.637 2.968 5.935 7.737 8.903 
1 April 2015 prices                                                                         
2 Given an average of 17 lives lost pr. year, directly or indirectly, associated with illicit drug abuse 
3 Average exchange rates in April 2015 were 0,058 NOK/ISK and 0,007 EUR/ISK 
Source: Hagstofa Íslands, 2014; Matthíasson, 2010; SÁÁ, 2010. 
As previously mentioned there are significant gaps in the knowledge about the causal link 
between drug use and some social cost elements, e.g. the causality between drugs and crime, 
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and drugs and labour market outcomes. Furthermore, researchers do not have access to the 
information and data required to properly estimate the private and external cost generated by 
illicit drug abuse (Moore, 2007; Reuter, 1999). With good assumption and sensitivity analysis 
the cost estimates can still be attainable, but it is important to make everything explicit so 
readers are aware of how ambiguous or imprecise the estimates can be (Moore, 2007). 
Another important shortcoming of this exercise, as previously discussed, is that intangible 
costs are not appropriately taken into account. Furthermore, unintended private cost, which is 
the base of the behavioural policy justification, is extremely underestimated (e.g. due to lack 
of data and uncertainty about tax payments). 
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8 Discussion 
The costs discussed and emphasized in this exercise are in no way exhaustive. The cost 
elements of drug abuse are various and the subject is complex, some costs are difficult to 
identify or convert into estimates. With that in mind, it is however supposed that the most 
fundamental aspects of the social cost have already been discussed in this thesis. Furthermore, 
even though flawed, the estimates obtained give a good sense of the extent of how much 
drugs are costing the Icelandic society. That is, the estimates give a reasonable idea about 
how large the social cost of illicit drug abuse actually is. This matters for policy discussion 
and in figuring out how big of a problem the “drug problem” really is, both for actual drug 
users and for others. That is how much private cost is borne by users and how much external 
cost it inflicts upon others, and what characterizes both sources of cost. Each particular drug 
type influences the costs in a specific manner. Therefore, it can be valuable for general drug 
policy discussion to look at different drug types separately. Even though the estimates by drug 
type are subject to many uncertainties they can be informative (Moore, 2007). Therefore, in 
Appendix 2, an effort is made to estimate the contribution of different illicit drug types to the 
problem at hand. 
A noteworthy aspect of drug use is that it is more often than not interlinked with other 
complex social problems. The drug abuse itself is therefore merely one of the deterministic 
factors for the harm it causes. This fact has to be kept in mind in any policy discussion 
(Babor, Caulkins et al., 2010). It can also be valuable to consider the relative harm of legal 
and illegal substances. Studies have shown that substances such as tobacco and alcohol can be 
at least as dangerous as many illicit drugs in terms of health effects, intoxication, toxicity, 
social harm, dependence and social stigma (Babor, Caulkins et al., 2010; Babor, Room et al., 
2010; Miller et al., 2006; Room, 2006). In Western-Europe the health problems generated by 
these legal substances are much more severe than those generated by illicit substances such as 
cannabis, cocaine or heroin (Gunnlaugsson, 2002).  
8.1 Theoretical arguments and how they apply to Iceland 
Assuming that the estimates in section 6 and 7 are a sufficient indicator of the magnitude of 
the social cost of drug use in Iceland the average annual social cost is 12.302 million ISK 
(April 2015 prices). According to these estimates the cost arguments for public policy 
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intervention in Iceland seem to be strong. However, the extent of the problem depends on the 
benefit too, i.e. how big the policy problem actually is depends on how much the social 
benefits outweigh the social cost. Presumably, as mentioned before, the social cost of illicit 
drug abuse is expected to exceed the social benefit of the abuse (e.g. value to users and profit 
of those involved in drug markets). Therefore, the net effect to society should be negative, i.e. 
net social cost. To estimate how negative is nevertheless challenging. From an economic 
perspective it is the relative share of the social cost compared to the benefit that matters most 
for policy justification, but as discussed in later in section 8.1.3 other viewpoints can also be 
important. The following subsections discuss the social cost and its implication for policy 
justification based on the theoretical arguments from section 3 as well as some important 
control effects that have to be kept in mind.  
8.1.1 Justification based on behaviour 
Behavioural theory, as discussed in section 3.1, can be used to rationalize or justify policy 
intervention based on the unaccounted private cost borne by drug users. That is, policy can be 
a desirable tool aimed at changing addictive behaviour for the addicts’ own good (Buck et al., 
1996). As discussed in section 3.1.2 not all of this cost is caused by rational decision making 
of the drug addict. The decision failure can be due to present bias, unstable preferences or 
choice capability, or social interaction and multiple equilibria. The underlying rationale for 
the decision failure is deterministic about the policy measures that can be justified based on 
behavioural theory (Røgeberg, 2007). For example, a common policy instrument for 
consumption considered unhealthy or bad for the consumer is corrective taxes. This method 
could help the consumer make his desired consumption decision in the case of present bias or 
social interaction, but would most likely not improve his welfare in the case of unstable 
preferences as the taxes would not affect his consumption choice (Bernheim and Rangel, 
2004; Røgeberg, 2007). This is of course not possible in the case of illegal drugs as authorities 
do not collect taxes on them, but it shows the logic behind the theory (and is more relevant for 
potential legalization discussion). If the addiction itself is causing the decision failure and the 
irrational choices, i.e. dependence disrupts the decision process which causes the decision 
maker to take a bad compulsive decision, it is better to put policy emphasis on preventing 
what triggers this undesired behaviour. For such smokers it might be more helpful to ban 
advertisement and other stimuli that triggers the need to smoke (Bernheim and Rangel, 2004; 
Røgeberg, 2007, 2012).  
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From behavioural economic viewpoint policies that increase the likelihood of self-regulating 
by the addict should be prioritized. This is quite intuitive as the cause of the drug problem 
from this perspective is lack of self-control and decision failure. Moreover, this type of policy 
is more likely to have various implications for different subgroups of users as not all users 
need the same kind of intervention. Some users have more control over their own 
consumption while others need much more help to restrain themselves, i.e. under some 
circumstances and for some drug users the substance use can be considered rational 
(Røgeberg, 2012). There are significant differences in the social cost generated by drug 
consumption conditional on whether drug consumers are dependent or non-dependent users 
(Moore, 2007). Better opportunities for self-control would therefore help those who are more 
compulsive in their decision making without affecting too much those who make more 
deliberate choices regarding their drug use. From this viewpoint decreased availability of 
drugs and their triggering factors is a good focus point for policy (Røgeberg, 2012). Whether 
it is actually possible to construct and implement an ideal drug policy of the type described 
here is out of the scope of this thesis and remains an unanswered question in its discussion.  
8.1.2 Justification based on negative externalities 
Welfare theory on externalities, as discussed in section 3.2, can be used to rationalize or 
justify policy intervention based on the external cost borne by others in society. That is, in 
their decision making drug users fail to account for the full social cost of their consumption. 
This leads to more than the socially optimal drug consumption, i.e. the level of drug use 
which gives the maximal welfare for society taking into account all possible costs and 
benefits for the whole society. Without incorporating the externalities into the individual 
decision making it systematically fails to account for the external costs generated which will 
cause net harm to society (Ekelund Jr and Hébert, 2007; Røgeberg, 2007). Theoretically this 
issue can be solved by Coasian bargaining or a Pigouvian tax as discussed in section 3.2. 
Ideally the Pigouvian tax should be equal to the externality which gives the best way to 
correct for the negative externality and obtain the optimal social welfare. In fact, one of the 
most common policy instruments used to correct for consumption-based negative externalities 
are corrective taxes (Røgeberg, 2007). In the case of drugs other policy instruments have to be 
discussed as taxes are clearly not a feasible policy intervention for illicit goods.  
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In the case of Iceland, and the discussion of section 6, the external cost of drug consumption 
seemed substantial and was assumed to be so in the net effect also. This corresponds to the 
traditional and most widely accepted economic argument for public policy, i.e. the negative 
external cost argument discussed in section 3.2.2. Aside from the external cost argument 
being the strongest one from an economic perspective it has been widely used in the political 
discussion of drugs and their implications for society (Røgeberg, 2007, 2012). The externality 
rationale for drug policy requires identifying and quantifying the externalities in order to 
implement the socially “correct” amount of drug consumption. That is, depending on the 
magnitude of the external cost some drug use could still occur as long as the social benefit 
(weakly) exceeds the social cost. This would be expected to differ vastly between drug types 
depending on how harmful they are (Røgeberg, 2007). Determining this optimal quantity of 
drug consumption from a welfare economic perspective is out of the scope of this thesis. It 
would require more detailed cost estimates as well as additional benefit estimation along with 
estimating the Icelandic demand and supply curves for drugs. Furthermore, there are not only 
pure economic factors that answer the question of ideal drug consumption. Deciding the 
desired level of drug consumption for society (zero, small, medium etc.) is also a matter of 
personal taste and social preferences based on attitudes towards drugs. As discussed in section 
2.3, Icelandic attitudes towards drugs are generally very negative. 
8.1.3 Effects of the control regime 
A substantial part of the external cost of drug consumption is due to the control regime, i.e. 
the institutional setup and broader political structure of the country. The fact that drugs are 
illegal generates one of the most significant cost elements of the external cost. That is, 
prohibition of drugs causes what might be defined as control costs. Therefore, the effort spent 
on reducing use and availability of drugs also generates costs for society and these cost have 
to be kept in mind in policy discussion (Babor, Caulkins et al., 2010; Babor, Room et al., 
2010). Many of the social cost elements considered in section 6, would not be identified as 
such for a different control regime. That is, cost related to law enforcement, courts and 
punishment would not be an issue if drugs were not illegal. A lot of money is spent on drug 
policies annually and even more is devoted to dealing with the consequences of illicit drugs in 
society, i.e. the bulk of drug-related spending goes to enforcing drug laws (Moore, 2007). In 
the case of Iceland social cost of law enforcement (mostly external) is about 26% of the 
average annual social cost, which can be substantial for high amounts. These external costs 
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would be “avoided” under a different control regime. It is in no way being argued here that 
drugs should be legal, but it is important to bear in mind that a great part of the external cost 
of drugs stems from the fact that they are illegal. Drugs are nonetheless harmful and there are 
other economic arguments than this “external cost avoiding” that support the claim that drugs 
should be prohibited, e.g. the behavioural reasons previously discussed in section 3.1. 
Of course the extent of the drug problem and what it involves varies between countries, but 
recently some countries have changed their policy emphasis based on arguments such as 
these. An example of this is a reduction in criminal penalties for small possession for personal 
use, but maintaining strong penalties for sale and distribution of hard substances such as 
heroin and cocaine (Babor, Caulkins et al., 2010; Babor, Room et al., 2010; Gunnlaugsson, 
2002, 2013). For this debate external cost estimates per drug type matter as different types 
obviously generate different costs for society. That is, policy emphasis against cannabis 
should differ from the one for amphetamine as cannabis is relatively less harmful for society.  
Diminishing marginal returns and difficulties in identifying the effects of tougher drug 
enforcement has caused a debate among researchers about whether drugs should be legalized 
or not (Babor, Caulkins et al., 2010; Babor, Room et al., 2010; Caulkins and Reuter, 2010; 
Pollack and Reuter, 2014). As mentioned before, corrective taxes are a common policy 
instrument for consumption considered unhealthy or bad. Both legal and illegal drugs are a 
major source of social cost, but legal addictive drugs are likewise a major source of tax 
revenue (Buck et al., 1996). If illicit drugs were made legal they could be taxed in accordance 
to the external cost they generate or in order to increase their cost for inducing self-controlling 
behaviour amongst users (Røgeberg, 2007). In this hypothetical situation this tax revenue 
would offset some of the social cost generated by drugs and it would depend on their net harm 
whether they should be completely banned or not.  
Another significant part of the external cost of drug consumption is due to the welfare system, 
i.e. it is borne by the publicly funded health system. In the absence of a social welfare system 
these costs would not be a part of external costs, but would be reassigned as private costs. The 
welfare state and the ideas about solidarity it entails creates externalities. That is, the welfare 
system is supposed to provide social security, reduce risk and differences in quality of life. 
This produces external costs since a large part of the harm caused by drugs ends up being 
funded by others in society. For example the health treatment of drugs, disability checks, 
rehabilitation and more is mostly publicly funded. Therefore, the redistributive features of this 
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system have to be considered while discussing the social cost of drugs (Røgeberg, 2012). If 
this system was not present a great part of the social cost discussed in section 6.3 would be 
defined as private cost instead of external cost.  
The effect of the control regime on the external (and private) cost estimates is essential to bear 
in mind in any policy discussion. It is certainly not being argued here that drugs should be 
legalized or that the welfare system should be revoked. That discussion is multidimensional, 
multidisciplinary, and simply out of the scope of this thesis. The cost arguments discussed in 
this subsection are only one side of the discussion and not the only relevant economic 
arguments. Even though social cost is a valuable contribution to the discussion this is not only 
a matter of comparing costs and benefits. Røgeberg (2007) notes that economic reasoning, 
based on cost-benefit arguments, is presumably too narrow for such big questions. In reality 
people often support policies that contradict the economic perspective. This is also a matter of 
what sort of society people want to live in and the general mind-set of that society (Røgeberg, 
2007). In a democratic society major policy changes have to be supported by the citizens of 
that society. Good policy goals have to take account of what people in society care most about 
and what societal goals they care about pursuing. Society’s attitude towards drugs, individual 
rights and the role of the government is also reflected in drug policy. It is therefore impossible 
to find a single policy advice or a global prescription to the drug problem, especially 
regarding the control regime debate considered in this subsection (Babor, Caulkins et al., 
2010; Babor, Room et al., 2010; Gunnlaugsson, 2013).  
8.2 Relevance for supply-side policy 
Considering both the traditional external cost arguments in section 3.2 as well as the 
behavioural arguments in section 3.1 gives an even stronger case for public policy 
intervention. In order to properly evaluate the benefit of supply-side policy not only the 
private and external costs of drug consumption would have to be evaluated, but also the 
benefits associated with the consumption. Even though it can be assumed that the costs 
outweigh the benefits, i.e. that there is a net social cost to society, the cost estimates alone are 
not sufficient for a proper conclusion. Furthermore, the costs and benefits of implementing 
each type of supply-side policy have to be evaluated which is more or less impossible to do 
accurately (based on the discussion in the above subsection). Analysing whether supply-side 
policy should be used as a tool for intervention in addictive drug markets and deciding which 
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type of supply control to use requires identifying, measuring and valuing all the costs and 
benefits associated with each alternative. Only then can it be verified whether public policy 
intervention is appropriate or not based on economic (cost) arguments. For any supply-side 
policy to be justifiable the reduction in private and external costs it entails must outweigh the 
loss of benefits following the changed drug consumption (Buck et al., 1996). On the other 
hand, for a policy intervention to be considered successful it does not mean it eliminates the 
targeted drug problem. If the policy works it is able to reduce the negative impact and 
prevalence of drug abuse (Babor, Caulkins et al., 2010; Babor, Room et al., 2010). The topic 
of policy justification is therefore quite complex.  
8.2.1 Regarding the law of supply and demand 
Prohibition itself raises prices of illicit drugs substantially. According to supply and demand 
theory added risk for those who supply drugs should decrease supply, i.e. shift the supply 
curve upwards. That is, when the risk of drug trade increases for the suppliers their production 
cost increases which reduces their supply for any given price. Increased risk should therefore 
result in even higher prices and less availability of illicit drugs according to the law of supply 
and demand. The risk component controlled by public policy is the risk of arrest, 
incarceration or imprisonment, and seizure of drugs and assets (Pollack and Reuter, 2014). 
However, there is little empirical evidence implying that raising the risk of arrest, 
imprisonment and/or seizure raises prices, neither for the prices at the targeted distribution 
level nor market prices (Caulkins and Reuter, 2010; Pollack and Reuter, 2014; Babor, 
Caulkins et al., 2010). The few studies that are available are conceptually and empirically 
flawed which makes their results quite incomparable (Pollack and Reuter, 2014), but their 
results have raised questions concerning the marginal benefit of supply-side enforcement 
policies (as mentioned in section 4.1). In particular, the lack of evidence of a price impact of 
tougher enforcement makes researchers highly doubt the benefit of strict policy regarding 
incarceration or imprisonment of drug offenders. This type of supply-side enforcement is very 
costly for society as well as having limited evidence for it being worth the effort (Caulkins 
and Reuter, 2010; Pollack and Reuter, 2014). According to Pollack and Reuter (2014) the 
limited price response of supply-side policy may be due to less flexibility in marginal prices 
compared to average prices, difficulties in preventing suppliers from finding alternative 
supply methods, and removing violent suppliers might actually reduce the risk instead of 
increasing it. 
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Theoretically, demand-side drug policy interventions would have different impact on drug 
prices as it is aimed at users instead of drug dealers, producers and importers (Pollack and 
Reuter, 2014). This type of policy is however not discussed further in this thesis as it is 
another type of issue than the sub-focus on supply-side policy. As addictive substances have 
some close substitutes (e.g. other illicit drug types and legal substances) it cannot be assumed 
that their demand is perfectly inelastic with respect to prices. The demand is however likely to 
be highly inelastic for some addictive drugs. Therefore, higher prices should decrease 
consumption for most addicts as the degree of addiction varies between different individuals 
and subgroups of drug users (Buck et al., 1996). That is, price responses should differ with 
degree of dependence. Therefore, if supply-side policy is able to achieve the desired price 
increase for drugs it should also reduce drug consumption in society. However, in some 
circumstances the result of a policy intervention aimed at raising prices can be 
counterintuitive. For example when the intervention decreases efficiency in drug markets so 
buyers experience more difficulties in finding sellers. In this situation the inefficiency leads to 
reduced demand (shifts the demand curve inwards) which can end up lowering drug prices 
instead of increasing them with an ambiguous effect on the quantity of drugs consumed. That 
is, either the intervention does not work or has the opposite effects from its goals (Pollack and 
Reuter, 2014).  
Based on the discussion in this subchapter it can prove difficult to clarify and quantify the 
benefits of supply-side policy, even though the social cost of drug consumption can be, or 
already has been, quantified. The challenge is not only methodologically demanding but also 
subject to various sources of uncertainties. This is however worthy of investigation in order to 
improve current drug policies. This approach has the potential to enable prioritising in policy 
making so it aims at the drugs and drug users causing the greatest harm in terms of private 
and external costs (Moore, 2007). 
8.2.2 The case of Iceland 
For interpreting the results with respect to supply-side policy it is necessary that reduction in 
costs is a consequence of reducing the quantity of drugs in circulation (Moore, 2007). This 
assumption is considered quite impeccable. The relationship between supply-side policy and 
supply reduction is however not as clear as it might seem at first. Seizing one unit of drugs 
does not mean a one unit reduction in market supply of that same drug type as discussed in 
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the above subsection. It has been questioned whether supply-side drug enforcement translates 
into reduced drug consumption. Caulkins and Reuter (2010) conclude that drug control might 
matter more for avoiding the formation of a new mass market than suppressing an already 
established mass market. Therefore, return to intense drug supply policy enforcement may be 
limited (Caulkins and Reuter, 2010). To support their result Caulkins and Reuter (2010) 
discuss substantial decline in cocaine and heroin prices in USA despite a massive increase in 
the risk of incarceration for those dealing with drugs. They explain this paradox by drug 
markets being out of the long run stable equilibrium. For policy the result of Caulkins and 
Reuter (2010) can for example be interpreted as suggesting increased emphasis on preventing 
new drugs from gaining foothold. In this regard, Pollack and Reuter (2014) note that an 
insignificant amount of the many new drug types developed each decade gain enough 
popularity to build up a new major market. That is, very few of them actually gain foothold. 
This is especially relevant for Iceland which has mostly managed to keep heroin, a 
particularly harmful and socially costly drug, out of the country. Harsh response and supply-
side policies can certainly have a great effect in this sense. 
In spite of uncertainties about quantity effects of supply-side policy, the social cost estimates 
can be a meaningful indicator of policy response in terms of cost savings for the society 
(Moore, 2007). Potential benefits could be evaluated by looking at the social cost estimates. 
How much the social cost decreases as a result of less drug supply depends on an inverse 
relationship prone to many uncertainties. However, uncertainty in policy discussion can be 
reduced by estimating the social cost (as was done in this thesis). That is, potential cost 
savings can be estimated in respect to supply reduction while it is unknown how to achieve 
that certain supply reduction (as discussed in the subsection above). This is crucial to bear in 
mind while assessing and developing illicit drug policy (Moore, 2007). As well is it important 
to take the social cost estimates, even though they are considered to be an appropriate 
indicator, with caution and not too literally.  
The struggle of reducing drug supply in Iceland occurs on multiple fronts where the police 
and customs play a major role. On account of Iceland being an island custom control on the 
border has a significant position in countering illegal import of drugs. As discussed 
previously, preventive measures taken by the police and customs can result in valuable cost 
savings for society in the form of reduced social cost. It is noted that custom control at the 
border is most likely more effective as each gram seized at the border is purer than each gram 
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already in circulation. Even though policy instruments in the battle against drugs differ in 
efficacy few can be disregarded. It is most likely the composition of different instruments and 
their interaction that has the greatest effect in reducing drug abuse. Each theoretical argument 
discussed in this thesis has different implications for policy as each reflects differently the 
underlying issues. In order to address these issues in the most efficient way they have to be 
considered in a broad context. As noted by Røgeberg (2007), considering a mix of regulation 
and policy could give the most efficient, accurate and politically acceptable way to deal with 
unwanted or unhealthy consumption such as illicit drug use 
Babor, Caulkins et al. (2010) discuss the vast differences in the impact of drugs depending on 
their class and administration method. These factors matter both for individual and societal 
outcomes, i.e. both for private and external costs. In this respect consumption of opioids, 
cocaine and amphetamines is more risky, especially when injected because injection is 
generally more risky in regard to mortality and other severe health outcomes. Drugs such as 
cannabis and ecstasy entail less risk based on this criteria in spite of their consumption being 
considerably more prevalent in most modern societies (Babor, Caulkins et al., 2010; Babor, 
Room et al., 2010). In this sense characteristics of the users can be as critical in determining 
costs as the specific drug type. According to Moore’s (2007) estimates dependent drug users 
generate 80% of the total social cost burden in the Australian society. Discussion of policy 
aimed at reducing dependent users is however outside the topic of the thesis as it relates to 
demand-sided policy (Moore, 2007). Furthermore, as previously noted, many harmful effects 
of drug use are associated with the physical and social setting of drug use instead of the 
inherent attributes of the actual drug (Babor, Caulkins et al., 2010; Babor, Room et al., 2010).  
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9 Conclusion 
The social cost estimates for Iceland are certainly not exhaustive and the assumptions made 
significantly influence the result. The resulting estimates are nonetheless expected to give 
important insights into the scope of the problem. That is, the extent of the social cost burden 
of illicit drug abuse borne by the Icelandic society each year. The social cost estimates are 
merely a tool for supporting the theoretical analysis of this thesis, i.e. the arguments for policy 
intervention and the implication for supply-side policy.  
Social cost of illicit drug use in Iceland seems substantial, both with respect to private and 
external cost. Therefore, the theoretical arguments for policy justification, discussed in this 
thesis, seem relevant for the Icelandic context. The behavioural arguments are particularly 
relevant for the subpopulation abusing hard drugs as their social situation is often very weak. 
Even though this group is a relatively small part of the Icelandic population its abuse can 
cause significant social costs. For most Icelanders who try illicit drugs the consumption is 
experimental and temporary without serious addiction problems. Since drug abuse is not very 
widespread the externality arguments, discussed in this thesis, are also relevant for the 
Icelandic context, especially given an unchanged control system. However, the extent of the 
problem also depends on the social value of drug use because it is the net social cost that 
determines how big the policy problem actually is, and what policy measures are fit to 
respond to it. Another important aspect of any policy discussion is the connection between 
illicit drug use and other social problems. The problem is clearly complex and public policy 
interventions have to take this complexity into account as well as possible in order to develop 
and implement adequate public strategies.  
It is important to keep the aggregate drug use under control, especially among young users. 
Icelandic attitudes towards illicit drug use are generally very negative and the society has 
responded harshly which has undoubtedly prevented illicit drug abuse from spreading further. 
Policy interventions in Iceland have been centred on supply-side policy with tough drug 
enforcement. Even though research indicate a limited return on intense supply-side 
enforcement the positive effect of such policies cannot be eliminated from the discussion. For 
Icelandic supply-side policy the greatest success has perhaps been preventing heroin, which is 
an extremely harmful drug, from gaining a foothold in the Icelandic drug markets. 
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Appendix 1: Estimates in other currencies 
This is based on the average exchange rate in April 2015 according to the Central Bank of 
Iceland. That is, 17,26 ISK/NOK and 146,76 ISK/NOK (Seðlabanki Íslands, 2015). The 
following tables show the main estimates in NOK and EUR as well as the sensitivity tables 
from section 7.1.  
NOK: 
Table A1. 1. Summary of estimates, million NOK. 
Cost category Source of social cost Social cost Total for category 
Traffic accidents Accidents including 
injuries 
261  
 Property damage 82 343 
Law 
enforcement 
National Police 92  
 District Commissioners 50  
 Public Prosecutor 3 145 
Courts Supreme Court 1  
 District Court 3  
 Official lawsuit cost 7  
 Public law assistance 3  
 Victim compensation 1 15 
Punishment Correctional facilities 26 26 
Health care National University 
Hospital 
19  
 Emergency Unit 33  
 Rehabilitation 38  
 Mortality 95 185 
Total   713 
1 April 2015 prices                                             
2 Given the assumptions in this thesis                   
3 Average exchange rates in April 2015 were 0,058 NOK/ISK and 0,007 EUR/ISK                                         
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Table A1. 2. Sensitivity to the share of illicit drug abusers, million NOK. 
Source of cost Lower limit Upper limit 
Traffic accidents 343 343 
Law enforcement 120 145 
Courts 12 15 
Punishment 22 26 
Health care 51 51 
Rehabilitation 26 38 
Mortality 95 95 
Total social cost 669 713 
1 April 2015 prices                                             
2 Lower limit based on a 40% share of illicit drug abusers at Vogur, upper limit based on a 60% share 
3 Average exchange rates in April 2015 were 0,058 NOK/ISK and 0,007 EUR/ISK 
 
Table A1. 3. Sensitivity to the share of illicit drugs in driver intoxication, million NOK. 
 10% 20% 30% 40% 50,42% 
Total social cost generated by 
traffic accidents 
68 136 204 272 343 
1 April 2015 prices                                                                         
2 Given the assumptions in this thesis                    
3 50% share gives 20% share in fatal accidents, and 14% share in severe and minor traffic accidents (explained in text)    
4 Average exchange rates in April 2015 were 0,058 NOK/ISK and 0,007 EUR/ISK 
 
Table A1. 4. Sensitivity to the share of drug abuse in drug-related crime, million NOK. 
 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
Average social cost pr. year, upper 
limit 
583 626 669 713 756 
Average social cost pr. year, lower 
limit 
562 598 633 669 704 
1 April 2015 prices                                                                         
2 Given the assumptions in this thesis                    
3 Lower limit based on a 40% share of illicit drug abusers at Vogur, upper limit based on a 60% share 
4 Average exchange rates in April 2015 were 0,058 NOK/ISK and 0,007 EUR/ISK 
 
Table A1. 5. Sensitivity to value of life, million NOK. 
 5,57 10,10 20,20 26,34 30,31 
Social cost of 
mortality 
95 172 344 448 516 
1 April 2015 prices                                                                         
2 Given an average of 17 lives lost pr. year, directly or indirectly, associated with illicit drug abuse 
3 Average exchange rates in April 2015 were 0,058 NOK/ISK and 0,007 EUR/ISK 
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EUR: 
Table A1. 6. Summary of estimates, million EUR. 
Cost category Source of social cost Social cost Total for category 
Traffic accidents Accidents including 
injuries 
31  
 Property damage 10 40 
Law 
enforcement 
National Police 11  
 District Commissioners 6  
 Public Prosecutor 0,4 17 
Courts Supreme Court 0,1  
 District Court 0,3  
 Official lawsuit cost 0,8  
 Public law assistance 0,4  
 Victim compensation 0,1 2 
Punishment Correctional facilities 3 3 
Health care National University 
Hospital 
2  
 Emergency Unit 4  
 Rehabilitation 5  
 Mortality 11 22 
Total   84 
1 April 2015 prices                                             
2 Given the assumptions in this thesis                   
3 Average exchange rates in April 2015 were 0,058 NOK/ISK and 0,007 EUR/ISK                                         
 
Table A1. 7. Sensitivity to the share of illicit drug abusers, million EUR. 
Source of cost Lower limit Upper limit 
Traffic accidents 40 40 
Law enforcement 14 17 
Courts 1 2 
Punishment 3 3 
Health care 6 6 
Rehabilitation 3 5 
Mortality 11 11 
Total social cost 79 84 
1 April 2015 prices                                             
2 Lower limit based on a 40% share of illicit drug abusers at Vogur, upper limit based on a 60% share 
3 Average exchange rates in April 2015 were 0,058 NOK/ISK and 0,007 EUR/ISK 
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Table A1. 8. Sensitivity to the share of illicit drugs in driver intoxication, million EUR. 
 10% 20% 30% 40% 50,42% 
Total social cost generated by 
traffic accidents 
8 16 24 32 40 
1 April 2015 prices                                                                         
2 Given the assumptions in this thesis                    
3 50% share gives 20% share in fatal accidents, and 14% share in severe and minor traffic accidents (explained in text)    
4 Average exchange rates in April 2015 were 0,058 NOK/ISK and 0,007 EUR/ISK 
 
Table A1. 9. Sensitivity to the share of drug abuse in drug-related crime, million EUR. 
 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
Total social cost, upper limit 69 74 79 84 89 
Total social cost, lower limit 66 70 74 79 83 
1 April 2015 prices                                                                         
2 Given the assumptions in this thesis                                                                      
3 Lower limit based on a 40% share of illicit drug abusers at Vogur, upper limit based on a 60% share 
4 Average exchange rates in April 2015 were 0,058 NOK/ISK and 0,007 EUR/ISK 
 
Table A1. 10. Sensitivity to value of life, million EUR. 
 0,66 1,19 2,38 3,10 3,56 
Social cost of 
mortality 
11 20 40 53 61 
1 April 2015 prices                                                                         
2 Given an average of 17 lives lost pr. year, directly or indirectly, associated with illicit drug abuse 
3 Average exchange rates in April 2015 were 0,058 NOK/ISK and 0,007 EUR/ISK 
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Appendix 2: Social cost per gram of 
different drug types 
Each drug type influences the social costs in a specific manner. Since the sub-focus of the 
thesis is on implication for supply-side policy it can be informative to estimate, at least 
roughly, the social cost each consumed gram puts on society. In order for this to be possible 
the average total drug use taking place in the society each year has to be estimated along with 
the relative harm of each drug type. Per gram estimates can be helpful for estimating policy 
response or the potential benefit of supply-side policy. In this appendix the social cost 
estimates of this thesis will be adapted to social cost per gram of drug type. The estimates are 
based on strong simplifications and are therefore faulty, but they can still help to speculate 
further on the previous discussion. One of the main assumption is that the annual quantity of 
drugs seized by the police or customs in Iceland is 15% of the actual quantity in circulation 
(i.e. the quantity being consumed). This is based on a European rule of thumb (10-15%) 
discussed in Matthíasson (2010). The average of confiscated grams in 2007-2013 is used to 
estimate this. Another assumption is about the relative harm of each drug type compared to 
the others. This is assumed to be 2,79 for heroin, 1,25 for amphetamine and ecstasy, 1,06 for 
cocaine and 0,47 for cannabis. This is based on a harm index represented in UNODC‘s 1997 
World Drug Report. In this index the different drug types are weighted by their relative harm 
to health1. This is perhaps too simplified as a particular drug type is expected to have different 
weights in different subcategories of the estimated social cost. This relative harm is however 
assumed to hold for illustrational purposes. Crime statistics of Ríkislögreglustjórinn (2014) 
are used to estimate the grams consumed per year, quantities in ml or pieces are disregarded. 
This should not affect the estimates too much as relative distribution remains rather stable. 
The social cost per gram of the most common drug types is derived by the formula:  
𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠 𝑝𝑟. 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 × 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘 ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑟. 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 (𝑥)  = 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑟. 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 
That, is:  𝑥 ∑ ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 × 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑟𝑢𝑔 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖 =  12.301.791.547,  
x is the benchmark harm pr. gram and after x has been identified it is multiplied with the 
relative harm of each particular drug type (given by the assumed index). This translates into 
                                                 
1 The numbers from this index were retrieved from an unpublished Swedish report on benefits of drug control. 
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estimates for social cost per gram. The average grams confiscated each year by the Icelandic 
police and customs control, the estimated quantity in circulation based on that, the harm index 
and the resulting social cost per gram of illicit drug type are summarized in the following 
table2. 
Table A2. 1. Social cost per gram of illicit drug type, rough estimates (in ISK) 
Drug type Average 
seized pr. 
year (g) 
Estimated 
quantity in 
markets (g) 
Relative 
harm rate 
grams*harm 
rate 
Social cost 
pr. gram 
Cannabis 97.172 647.811 0,47 304.471 9.416 
Amphetamine 30.390 202.598 1,25 253.248 25.043 
Cocaine 5.280 35.201 1,06 37.313 21.236 
Ecstasy 2.277 15.180 1,25 18.975 25.043 
Heroin 2 12 2,79 35 55.895 
1 Based on the assumption that 15% of the yearly drug use is confiscated by the police or customs 
2 Cannabis, marijuana, hash, cannabis leaves and cobs counted together                           
3 Cannabis plants and tobacco mixed cannabis excluded                                                     
3 Amphetamine and methamphetamine counted together                                                     
4 Other quantities directly from the 2013 crime statistics                                                     
5 Calculations explained in text                                                                                    
 
For interpreting these results with respect to supply-side policy it has to be the case that 
reduction in drug supply will reduce the social cost. Such comparison greatly depends on the 
factors discussed in section 8 of this thesis. For these calculations to be relevant the main 
assumption is that social costs can indeed be associated with different types of drugs. Another 
assumption important for the applicability of these calculations is that a decrease in quantity 
consumed will decrease the associated social costs (Moore, 2007). According to Moore 
(2007) this assumption is likely to hold for small changes in quantity consumed of different 
drug types, but would most likely not hold for larger changes. It is important to keep in mind 
the caveats of these estimates and the uncertainties about how supply-side policy effects 
actual drug supply which were discussed thoroughly in section 8 of this thesis. One gram 
seized by the police or customs does not necessarily translate into a one gram reduction in 
drug consumption. These estimates can still be a meaningful indicator of potential cost 
savings of supply reduction while it is unknown how to actually achieve the desired reduction 
in drug supply.  
                                                 
2 These estimates are largely in line with the results of the Swedish report. 
